Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-101 *23 May 1996*

CONTENTS

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BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Turkey Expresses Concern About PKK Presence *[Ankara ANATOLIA]* 1
Bulgaria: Turkey Objects to Sofia Balkan Conference Dates *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: Turkey's Attitude Toward Sofia Meeting Analyzed *[KONTINENT 23 May]* 1
Bulgaria: BSP Daily Rejects Turkish Position on Meeting *[DUMA 23 May]* 1
Bulgaria: Croat Official Briefed on Sofia Balkan Meeting *[Sofia Radio]* 2
Bulgaria: Khristov Discusses Goals of Balkan Meeting *[KONTINENT 23 May]* 2
Bulgaria: Zhelev on Linkage of Foreign, Domestic Policies *[24 CHASA 22 May]* 3
Bulgaria: BSP Deputies Concerned About Bread Shortage *[KONTINENT 23 May]* 4
Bulgaria: Bread Shortage Seen Threatening BSP Rule *[KONTINENT 23 May]* 4
Bulgaria: Totomirov Discusses Military Reform, Funding *[DEMOKRATSIYA 22 May]* 5

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Exercises Under Way in Boletice Military Area *[DENNI TELEGRAF 22 May]* 7
Czech Republic: Daily Reveals Cost of U.S. Fighter Offer *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 22 May]* 7
Czech Republic: People Pragmatic About Czech-German Relations *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 22 May]* 7

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Chief of Staff Discusses Army, NATO, Neutrality *[PRAVDA 18 May]* 9
Slovakia: Article Argues Against Joining NATO *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 20 May]* 9
Slovakia: Anger in National Council Over SIS Head's Report *[Bratislava Radio]* 11

HUNGARY

Hungary: Defense Official on NATO Compatibility Issue *[NEPSZABADSAG 22 May]* 13
Hungary: Simonyi on Fighter Plane Purchase, NATO Conditions *[NEPSZAVA 22 May]* 13
Hungary: Foreign Spokesman Views Talks With Romania *[NEPSZAVA 22 May]* 14

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Klickovic Visits Brcko, Comments on Refugees *[Brcko Radio]* 16
B-H: Bosnian Serb PM Questions IFOR Role in Brcko Area *[Brcko Radio]* 16
B-H: Krajisnik Interviewed on Referendum on Serb Leadership *[SRNA]* 17
B-H: Kasagic-Karadzic Power Struggle Viewed *[SVIJET 23 May]* 17
B-H: Karadzic Comments on Dayton, Elections, Hague Tribunal *[Brussels KNACK 22-28 May]* 19
B-H: DSS Chairman Backs Karadzic as Legitimate President *[SRNA]* 22
B-H: Plavsic Prepared To 'Stand' in Presidential Elections *[AFP]* 22
B-H: Banja Luka Mayor Explains Talks With U.S. Delegation *[SRNA]* 22
B-H: Return of 152 Serbs to Grbavica 'Encouraging' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 22
B-H: Bosnian Serbs Seek Information on 108 POW's *[Pale Radio]* 23
B-H: Police Say 7 Captured Muslims Treated Correctly by Serbs *[TANJUG]* 23
B-H: PM Muratovic Receives U.S. Trade Envoy, Delegation *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
B-H: Presidency Member Says Dayton Accord 'Greatest Failure' *[Pale Radio]* 23
B-H: Federation Interior Minister Views Police Forces *[VJESNIK 20 May]* 24

B-H: Gen Delic Addresses Air Force Anniversary Celebration *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
B-H: 'Senior Defence Sources': IFOR To Remain in Bosnia *[London INDEPENDENT 23 May]* 26
B-H: Mostar Elections Delayed; Refugees Permitted To Vote *[AFP]* 27
B-H: Mostar Croats Deny Agreeing To Delay Elections *[AFP]* 27
B-H: EU Official Refuses To Confirm Mostar Election Delay *[AFP]* 27
B-H: UNHCR Bus Opens Mostar-Nevesinje Bus Route *[Sarajevo Radio]* 28
B-H: EU Signs Deals on Water, Agricultural Aid *[AFP]* 28
B-H: Impact of 'Gray Economy' Seen as Increasing *[BH PRESS]* 28

CROATIA

Croatia: Granic, U.S.'s Kornblum Issue Statement on Talks *[Zagreb TV]* 29
Croatia: Susak, Ukrainian Defense Minister Sign Memorandum *[Zagreb Radio]* 29
Croatia: Granic Says Croatia's Role in Bosnia Constructive *[Zagreb Radio]* 29
Croatia: Council of Europe Decision Criticized *[VJESNIK 20 May]* 30
Croatia: UN Project To Return Serbs, Croats to Slavonia Noted *[TANJUG]* 31
Croatia: Hadzic's Appointment in Slavonia Criticized *[SRPSKA REC 6 May]* 31
Croatia: Tudjman Insists Mostar Elections Comply With Dayton *[Zagreb Radio]* 32

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: British Ambassador Explains Visa Difficulties *[MIC]* 33
FYROM: Serb Leader Criticizes Remarks by Gligorov *[SRNA]* 33
FYROM: DPS Leader Says Rugova Often Visits Gligorov *[MIC]* 33
FYROM: Human Rights Party Leader Gives News Conference *[Sofia Radio]* 33
FYROM: Xhafferi on Albanians' 'Deep Dissatisfaction' *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 20 May]* 34
FYROM: Assembly Accepts Public Petition for Referendum *[Skopje Radio]* 38

POLAND

Poland: Kolodko Confirms Poland To Join OECD 11 Jul *[Warsaw Radio]* 39
Poland: Belarusian Version of Solidarity Incident Rejected *[Warsaw Radio]* 39
Poland: Acting UOP Head Views Policies, Oleksy Case *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 May]* 39
Poland: Weekly Questions Credibility of Witness in Oleksy Case *[WPROST 26 May]* 42
Poland: UOP Allegedly Spies on German Minority Activists *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 22 May]* 43
Poland: Diplomats Discuss Problems of Poles in Lithuania *[PAP]* 44
Poland: Minister Views Education for Ethnic Lithuanians *[BNS]* 45
Poland: Sejm Commission on U.S. Hellfires, Defense Budget *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 22 May]* 45
Poland: Interior Ministry To Establish Air Component *[PAP]* 46
Poland: Government Criticizes Central Bank Policies *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 22 May]* 46

ROMANIA

Romania: Iliescu Suggests 29 Sep for Parliamentary Elections *[Bucharest Radio]* 47
Romania: Van With Secret Documents 'Vanished' in Bulgaria *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 20 May]* 47
Romania: Babiuc on 'Immense' Number of SRI Wiretappings *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 20 May]* 48

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Drnovsek Said To Support Transitional Government *[Ljubljana Radio]* 49
Slovenia: Military Leaders Give President Annual Briefing *[DELO 9 May]* 49
Slovenia: Military Secret Service Head Expected To Be Replaced *[DELO 21 May]* 49

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Seselj Has 'Documents That Incriminate Milosevic' *[Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA 23 May]* 51

FRY: SPS, JUL Discuss Future Cooperation *[Belgrade TV]* 52
FRY: SPS, JUL Coordination Meeting Reported *[TANJUG]* 52
FRY: Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict Reaching Final Stage *[SRPSKA REC 6 May]* 52
FRY: Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict Said To Be Increasing *[SRPSKA REC 6 May]* 55
FRY: Former Senior Policeman Shot Dead in Belgrade *[TANJUG]* 57

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic, U.S. Official Discuss Day-on Implementation *[TANJUG]* 58
Serbia: Kornblum Briefs Media on Talks With Milosevic *[Belgrade TV]* 58
Serbia: Kosovo Serbs Accuse Milosevic of Breaking Promises *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 23 May]* ... 58

Bulgaria: Turkey Expresses Concern About PKK Presence

TA2205173596 Ankara ANATOLIA in Turkish 1605 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia (AA)—Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, Turkish ambassador to Sofia, has said that Turkey regrets the fact that the separatist terrorist organization PKK [Workers Party of Kurdistan] has been carrying out tactically aimed activities under various guises in Sofia for some time.

Irtemcelik pointed out that the separatist terrorist organization targets Turkey's territorial integrity, economic development efforts, and stability. He said: "The most distinguished experts in the field of international terrorism assess the PKK as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world."

Irtemcelik pointed out that Turkey is extremely sensitive about the terrorist organization's activities outside the country, adding: "To our Bulgarian interlocutors, we voice our views and concerns, with a frankness that comes from our friendly feelings, about the dangerous developments that can be caused by a misinterpretation of the organization."

The ambassador expressed the hope that the Bulgarian officials will adopt a more careful and determined attitude about the growing presence and activities of the separatist terrorist organization and its cover organizations. He added: "We have no doubt that Bulgaria will act in line with the spirit of international and bilateral agreements."

Bulgaria: Turkey Objects to Sofia Balkan Conference Dates

AU2205171096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Turkey will not participate in the Sofia meeting of the Balkan ministers of foreign affairs if the dates of the meeting are not changed, Turkish Ambassador to Bulgaria Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik said at a news conference today. The reason is the upcoming Habitat-2 UN nutrition conference, which will take place from 3 to 14 June in Istanbul. The conference in Turkey will be a very significant event, attended by 25 high-ranking governmental representatives, the ambassador said, and insisted on changing the dates of the Sofia conference.

The Sofia conference was scheduled to take place on 7-9 June. Albania also finds those dates inconvenient because of this country's general elections, which will take place then.

Bulgaria: Turkey's Attitude Toward Sofia Meeting Analyzed

AU2305115396 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 May 96 p 16

[Commentary by Plamen Yotinski: "Balkan Haggling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Clouds are hovering over the 8-9 June Sofia meeting of Balkan foreign ministers. However, there will hardly be any thunderstorm. More likely, there will be a storm in a teacup.

Reportedly, the Albanian foreign minister cannot come because of the the parliamentary elections with all the surprises that they could serve up. However, since the contents of about 90 percent of the meeting's documents have already been agreed, the demand to postpone the event by two or three weeks is beginning to resemble haggling.

Formally, Turkey has a reason for not sending its first diplomat: the Habitat-2 meeting that it is to host. However, the Turkish foreign minister will hardly be staying in Istanbul for the entire 12 days of the conference and, with a little good will, he could slip over to Sofia.

Since the Turkish diplomatic school is considered one of the best in the world, Ankara's (current) refusal to send its representative to the 8-9 June Sofia meeting raises some questions. On the one hand, this step could have been prompted by the instability in Turkey itself. Perhaps Ankara is trying to kill the European orientation of the Balkan dialogue? Another explanation could be Turkey's envy of Bulgaria hosting a significant event or it may be attempting to show that no important decision can be made in the Balkans without Ankara's right to give its ultimate approval.

Let us hope that the old Bulgarian proverb "I do not want to prosper, I want my neighbor to suffer" has not become popular in Turkey and that the meeting in Sofia will nevertheless take place.

Bulgaria: BSP Daily Rejects Turkish Position on Meeting

AU2305102696 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by Radoslav Tsanchev: "What Is Ankara's Goal in Demanding the Postponement of Balkan Meeting?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Turkish ambassador to Sofia announced that his country will not take part in the Sofia meeting of the Balkan ministers of foreign affairs

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if this meeting takes place on 8-9 June. The reason—during the same period Turkey will host the Habitat-2 international conference, which will be attended by highranking politicians from all over the world. The ambassador proposed that the Sofia meeting be postponed.

The reason, to put it mildly, does not appear to be a serious one. Everyone knows that at such long conferences the prominent politicians do not stay for the whole period of the event, but come for the opening or the closing. Nothing prevents the Turkish foreign minister from coming for a day or two to Sofia in the middle on the Habitat-2 conference. Even if he comes by car, he will still make it.

This means that the real reason is different. It is well known that such meetings are planned and prepared in a through and methodical manner. Dates and documents are coordinated. If the meeting indeed is postponed, the new dates could prove inconvenient for another participant, that the situation has changed, or, God forbid, that a cabinet has fallen. This would mean new and endless postponements.

That the Sofia conference be held during the first 10 days of June is a fact that was coordinated a long time ago. The conference will be attended by representatives of the EU, OSCE, the United Nations, and the international financial institutions. There is definitely great interest in the meeting. Who is interested in foiling it? Perhaps, someone does not like the fact that the conference will take place in Sofia, and that the Bulgarian foreign minister, as host, will appear as a unique spokesman for the Balkan states, and afterward, he will hand the documents adopted by the conference to the EU summit meeting in Florence?

If this indeed is so, it should be stated directly, rather than using such transparent excuses.

Bulgaria: Croat Official Briefed on Sofia Balkan Meeting

AU2305102896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 23 May Ivan Simonovic, Croatia's deputy minister of foreign affairs, received Ivan Khristov, Bulgaria's deputy minister of foreign affairs, who briefed him on the preparations for the meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers, which will take place in Sofia in June.

The foreign ministers will discuss at the meeting improving security and political and economic cooperation among the countries in the region. Croatia will participate as an observer, HINA reports.

The two diplomats expressed satisfaction with the state of Bulgarian-Croat relations and supported their further development, especially in the field of economy.

Bulgaria: Khristov Discusses Goals of Balkan Meeting

AU2305123196 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Khristov, Bulgarian deputy foreign minister, by Ulyana Prumova; place and date not given: "Sofia Meeting Will Open Balkans to Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Prumova] Minister Pirinski intends to invite Contact Group representatives to the Sofia meeting of Balkan foreign ministers. Do you expect the foreign ministers of the Contact Group countries to attend the conference, and why?

[Khristov] Bulgaria sees a mutual connection between our initiative and the tasks and concerns of the Contact Group. This group aims to find a formula for stabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is a part of the Balkans. Our initiative for stabilizing southeastern Europe aims at the same direction. If a climate of stability and security is created around Bosnia-Herzegovina, it will obviously help to solve its problems. Minister Pirinski will send a message to the Contact Group countries, but it is too early to tell who will represent them.

[Prumova] Why is the Turkish minister not coming to the Sofia meeting?

[Khristov] Turkey is hosting Habitat-2 and has difficulty with the dates we have proposed. However, the dates have been accepted and officially confirmed by Romania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Greece, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There is an important factor that must be kept in mind: The meeting agenda, which was coordinated on 3 May by the Balkan foreign ministries' directors, stresses that the meeting will adopt and convey two appeals. The first will be addressed to the 14-15 June Florence meeting on the implementation of the peace accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other—to the 21-22 June meeting of the Council of Europe, which will also take place in Florence. Obviously, if those messages are to be sent, the Sofia conference must take place before the other two meetings. We proposed the dates 8-9 June. In addition to Turkey, Albania also has problems because of the election situation there.

[Prumova] Is there another reason for those countries' unwillingness to participate?

[Khristov] I can think of no other reason than the technical difficulties because the agenda was agreed with the

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participation of Albanian and Turkish representatives. More than 90 percent of the text of the concluding declaration that the meeting will adopt has been approved by Turkey and Albania. Turkey was one of the most active countries—in the constructive sense of the word—when this draft document was discussed.

[Prumova] Would the impact of the meeting be lessened if Turkey and Albania do not come?

[Khristov] We have a coordinated declaration of the Foreign Ministries. It reflects the position of those countries. The impact will not be lessened. [passage omitted]

[Prumova] Do you expect any conflict between Greece and Macedonia regarding the name on the Macedonian delegation's name-plate?

[Khristov] I do not exclude such a possibility. It has already become a tradition. However, we expect this issue to be resolved by the two countries beforehand, rather than Bulgaria resolving it for them. We rely on their constructive attitude and good will.

[Prumova] Will President Zhelev greet the participants?

[Khristov] This matter has not been discussed yet. However, I think that the head of state must address a meeting of such importance and level.

[Prumova] Is Minister Pirinski expected to visit Turkey?

[Khristov] There is no definite date for his visit. Obviously, at present both countries are engaged in very ambitious international events. I most realistically think that this visit could take place in the summer.

[Prumova] What about Skopje? The visit there was postponed.

[Khristov] This is unfortunately true. The visit will take place when a suitable atmosphere is created.

Bulgaria: Zhelev on Linkage of Foreign, Domestic Policies

AU2205145296 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 22 May 96 p 10

[Interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Yovka Dimitrova and Lina Atanasova; place and date not given: "Primaries Could Be More Important Only for Some Opposition Megalomaniac"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [24 CHASA] It has been said that our financial system is on the point of collapse. On Sunday, the press even mentioned a state of emergency. What signals do you get from the government?

[Zhelev] When one mentions the introduction of a state of emergency, one is using political factors and questioning the country's democratic assets and legal order.

I think that it is an exaggeration to talk about such a situation, unless it spreads outside the sphere of banking. "State of emergency" is not the most suitable term to describe what is happening at the moment... [passage omitted]

[24 CHASA] As head of state did you expect such an economic collapse?

[Zhelev] You know my attitude toward the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] government, and more specifically, toward Videnov's cabinet. Like many others, I cherished hopes and illusions that, as younger people, unburdened by prejudice, they would be more pragmatic and would have a broader outlook. Alas, this was not so. We are all victims of an illusion.

It was no accident that they delayed the reform for a whole year. They pondered the issue of mass privatization, while everything should have started much earlier. They said that they had schemes ready, which they could activate almost immediately after they formed the government. It turned out that this was not so. Furthermore, something much worse emerged. They cannot rule and they are the victims of their own illusion in thinking that they have competent experts. [passage omitted]

[24 CHASA] According to you, what part of the BSP voters would vote for you and under what conditions?

[Zhelev] When Bulgaria is in such a critical situation I cannot divide the suffering people into "red" [BSP] and "blue" [Union of Democratic Forces—SDS] voters. We are all in a disastrous situation and we all—orange [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], red, and blue—are paying the price for Videnov's poor management. Second, I am convinced that people who voted for the BSP in the past understand three basic things about myself: That I do not steal and do not patronize a "circle of friends," that no one has succeeded in blackmailing me because there is nothing to blackmail me with, and that I do not allow party centers to place their interests above national interests. Therefore, as the candidate of the united opposition, I will rely on the vote of all citizens in the fall. [passage omitted]

[24 CHASA] Why did you direct your campaign mainly toward foreign policy issues? Since you view the presidential elections as a prelude to early parliamentary elections, would it not be more logical to direct your attacks toward domestic policy targets?

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[Zhelev] There are at least two reasons for this. According to our constitution, the president has special responsibilities and prerogatives in foreign policy.

Second, during the period of transition foreign and domestic policies are so closely interrelated that it is impossible to separate them. For example, the isolation toward which Videnov's government is pushing Bulgaria, because of internal and even innerparty reasons, is one of the main reasons for the 1996 crisis. Is the fact that there is no investment a foreign problem or a domestic one? The fact that we were invited to join the new USSR—is that a domestic problem or a foreign one? The fact that in 1995 we rejected the IMF and are now clutching at it—is this a matter of domestic policy or foreign policy? When the rulers do not have a clear long-term foreign policy strategy the entire foreign policy becomes internal policy. However, I am sure that Bulgarian society will not allow itself to become a hostage of the BSP's infighting.

Bulgaria: BSP Deputies Concerned About Bread Shortage

AU2305120196 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 May 96 p 1

[Staff report: "Shivarov Falls Because of Bread"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A participant in the 22 May meeting of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction says that the participants demanded the resignation of Agriculture Minister Svetoslav Shivarov because of the bread crisis.

According to them, Shivarov "has made a total mess" in agriculture, and his incompetence has exacerbated the grain crisis. The deputies said that they fear a meeting with their voters because they do not know how to explain the bread shortage and the sharp increase in the bread price to them.

Shivarov and [Deputy Prime Minister] Doncho Konakchiev were summoned to the meeting to explain the country's grain balance, but they did not appear. Shivarov also refrained from attending the second, evening session of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction.

Georgi Lambov, chief secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, informed the deputies that, according to the ministry's information, there is grain for no more than three days, and that there is a danger of social tension throughout the country. Boncho Rashkov, chairman of the National Assembly Commission on Agriculture, has suggested releasing the military grain reserve in order to overcome the crisis.

A proposal was made to purchase grain from Kazakhstan, because of its low price there.

Zlatimir Orsov [National Assembly member from the Bulgarian Socialist Party] told KONTINENT that it is imperative to import grain as soon as possible, regardless from where and at what cost.

Lambov said that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is guarding the grain during its transportation from the three exit points—Ruse, Varna, and Kalotina—to its arrival in the silos and mills. The grain tends to disappear during transportation.

During the meeting, the Democratic Left deputies were amazed to hear that there is a staff at the Ministry of Agriculture that is coordinating the grain supply and that it is chaired by Minister Shivarov. Elena Poptodorova has proposed to move Shivarov to another ministry, because he spends most of his time unveiling monuments and resolving the problems of the Holy Synod candle factory.

Most of the deputies think that grain is being imported, and, as a result of shady deals, it disappears. They suspect that companies that belong to the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union are involved in this.

KONTINENT correspondents report that the supply of bread during the days on the eve of the holiday [24 May—Day of Slavonic Letters], is critical.

Bulgaria: Bread Shortage Seen Threatening BSP Rule

AU2305120096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23 May 96 p 16

[Commentary by Rumyana Strugarova: "Bread—Lever of Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the incident of electing the head of the State Savings Bank in 1995 and the recent [Television Director] "Granitski" case [cases in which the Democratic Left parliamentary faction acted against the recommendations of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP, leadership], yesterday the Democratic Left parliamentary faction again demonstrated their strong character. For the first time, the rulers were forced to admit that there was a bread shortage in the country. It is significant that the deputies demanded clear and precise information on the bread in the country, as well as guarantees that the government could cope with the problem. It is indicative that the meeting took place while the prime minister was absent from the country. It also is important that the minister of agriculture [Svetoslav Shivarov] and the deputy prime minister [Doncho Konakchiev], who were invited to the meeting, did not honor the participants with their presence. These facts imply that relations between the parliamentary

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majority faction and its government are far from the notions of positive unity of thought and rulers' unity of action.

However, what is most surprising is that the parliamentary discontent in the Democratic Left emerged a few days after increasing numbers of voices in the BSP are demanding to listen to the internal party criticism on the eve of the presidential elections. Obviously, there are forces in the BSP which are alarmed that the critical financial and economic situation is sufficiently dangerous and, therefore, people will not be able to silently absorb yet another plight—the bread crisis. From a tactical point of view, this is not the time for ministerial resignations. However, from a strategic point of view, the bread shortage could sweep up not only the government, Videnov, and the hope for a red president. The bread shortage is the most direct road toward a crisis in the BSP's rule and toward a general crisis of confidence in left-wing forces.

Bulgaria: Totomirov Discusses Military Reform, Funding

AU2205132096 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 22 May 96 p 7

[Interview with Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, by Nedko Petrov; place and date not given: "Army Remains Chief Guarantor of Our Independence and Territorial Integrity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Petrov] General Totomirov, on 1 January 1996 the reform in the Bulgarian Army was launched with the introduction of the corps and brigade structure. Now, four months later, what state is the army reform in, and is there any risk of a repetition of the situation existing from 1992 to 1994, when your predecessor claimed that "the reform is under way," but in fact nothing was done?

[Totomirov] Yes, the structural reform has really started. The necessary conditions were created for this by the passing of the Defense and Armed Forces Act and the updating of the concept for the reform in the Bulgarian Army for the 1995-2010 period. Much has been done to prepare the cadres for the transition to a corps and brigade organizational structure. Recently I visited the Military Academy, where the teaching and command staff has rewritten a considerable part of the teaching materials in conformance with the new organization.

Now, I can say confidently that all the preliminary preparations have been made and all the necessary conditions created, and since the start of this year we have begun to implement the changes according to the planned schedule.

A new structure has been created for accepting and training incoming conscripts that has already proved its high effectiveness.

The Ground Forces and Naval Commands are ready to be reorganized into main headquarters, while the army administrations are to be reformed into corps administrations. This is the first step on the road of transition to a corps and brigade organization.

Unfortunately, for reasons outside the General Staff's control, the reorganization in the Air Force and certain Ground Forces units planned for this April has been delayed until the fourth quarter of 1996. The other actions have been replanned accordingly. [passage omitted]

[Petrov] What is your comment on the difficulties that the state is experiencing from the aspect of the military, General? The jump in the dollar exchange rate will affect the military budget, and hence the Army's maintenance and combat readiness. Under these conditions, with the Bulgarian Army continue to be a guarantor of our national security?

[Totomirov] It is well known that the military's budget for 1996 barely satisfies its most immediate needs. Within these limited possibilities, we have planned exercises for the troops on combat and mobilization readiness and operational and combat training.

The shortage of funding is severely felt in all departments concerned with supplying the troops, but the situation with equipment supplies is the most serious. Much of this activity is connected with the import of spares and ammunition. The change in the exchange rate seriously affects the volume of these deliveries. We have had to review our plans for material and equipment supplies, both imports from abroad and domestic supplies, in view of the fluctuations arising as a result of the current economic situation.

The increase of the excise duties on aviation fuel, kerosene, diesel fuel, and light marine fuel oils has created a serious risk of disturbing the rhythm of the armed forces' day-to-day operations.

These additional factors pose a risk that the training of flying, navigational, and leading personnel may fall below the critical minimum. Apart from affecting the level of combat readiness, the reduced supplies create conditions for breakdowns and accidents involving expensive weapons and equipment.

The consequences of this financial instability for the Bulgarian Army's future are difficult to foresee. This issue is too important, all-embracing, and many-sided to be dealt with in a few lines. The leadership of the

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General Staff considers that no one should underestimate issues relating to national security.

For the time being, despite the difficulties and shortages, the formations, units, and administrative bodies are carrying out their duties, and the Bulgarian Army remains the guarantor of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bulgaria. [passage omitted]

[Petrov] General Totomirov, Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov has succeeded in launching the idea of holding a meeting of all the Balkan defense ministers in Sofia this autumn, attended by representatives from the United States and Russia. Do you see any possibility of holding a meeting of the chiefs of general staffs of the Balkan region as a way to establish lasting peace?

[Totomirov] The future meeting of Balkan defense ministers would provide a good basis for an eventual meeting of the chiefs of general staffs of these countries. However, such a meeting would play a positive role only if the chiefs of the general staffs of the armies of all the Balkan states participate.

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Czech Republic: Exercises Under Way in Boletice Military Area

AU2205153696 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 22 May 96 p 2

[Report by "(fp)": "The Command Staffs Are Exercising in the Hills"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The command-staff exercises designated "TABOR 96" and directed by Jiri Nekvasil, chief of the Czech Army General Staff, will last until Thursday [23 May]. Some 2,400 troops are conducting exercises in the wooded and hilly terrain of the Boletice military area, with 40 armored personnel carriers and 470 vehicles. Members of the 1st Army Corps command and units from the 2d Mechanized Brigade make up a large part of those taking part in the exercises. The objective of the exercises is to train the staffs thoroughly in commanding units, while defending the state under complicated conditions. Foreign observers have been invited to Boletice, and the inspector general of the Austrian Bundesheer [Federal Army], General Karl Majcen, will also take part in the exercises.

Czech Republic: Daily Reveals Cost of U.S. Fighter Offer

AU2205132896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 May 96 p 2

[Report by "(gag, gro)": "The Americans Have Announced How Much Their Most Modern Fighters Will Cost the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague/Washington—The United States is the first of the countries offering to sell modern supersonic fighters to the Army to announce the price for which it is willing to supply the aircraft. At the same time, Foreign Ministry officials are saying that this offer is substantially lower than the amount the Americans had been talking about earlier. But they are keeping it strictly confidential. Army officials have also refused to discuss the offer because the chief of the General Staff has placed a rigorous ban on providing any sort of information.

The details of the offer were published on Monday [20 May] in the U.S. military brochure ARMS TRADE NEWS, which carries regular reports on arms deals. The report was confirmed by the press spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Prague, Leonardo Williams.

The Americans are offering to supply a total of 48 aircraft worth $1.58 billion overall—that is, approximately 44.2 billion korunas [Kc]. The sum exceeds the Army's current annual budget by Kc14 billion.

For this money, the Air Force would get 24 of the most modern F-16 fighter aircraft and 18 F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers [numbers as published]. Thus, one F-16 fighter would come to $36 million, while the Hornet would be $43 million. Arms industry experts think that, in view of the price asked, these are completely new aircraft.

However, the government that will emerge from the coming parliamentary elections will make the decision on purchasing the aircraft. The Air Force's new aircraft will not be paid for from the Army's budget, and, therefore, the Cabinet has to find the resources from which it will finance their purchase. The U.S. offer came at the same time that Michael Portillo, British secretary of state for defense, in his talks with his counterpart, Vilem Holan, spoke on behalf of the purchase of the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen fighter aircraft. The sale of these fighters is being mediated by the British Aerospace company.

The director of the Foreign Ministry's department for security policy, Hynek Fajmon, has welcomed the rivalry among the world's aviation companies. "The Republic could acquire state-of-the-art aircraft at a considerably lower price because of this competition," said Fajmon.

Apart from the U.S. and Swedish offers, the Army is also considering purchasing the French Mirage 2000 aircraft. The price of neither the Swedish nor the French offer has yet been disclosed.

Another option is to obtain 18 older F-16 aircraft that the Americans have modernized. The Army would get them for Kc5-6 billion.

Czech Republic: People Pragmatic About Czech-German Relations

AU2205132696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 May 96 p 1

[Report by "(km, mkl)": "People Are Adopting a Pragmatic Stance Toward a Czech-German Settlement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—At a time when the politicians are racking their brains over the settlement of Czech-German relations, the majority of people would exchange quite pragmatically an apology for the postwar transfer for a promise that the Germans will not sue for property in border areas.

The willingness to accede to these bilateral concessions is apparent from a representative public opinion poll conducted in mid-May by the Factum agency. More than half of the respondents—55 percent—would, according to the survey, agree with a Czech-German declaration

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in which the Czechs would distance themselves morally from the transfer of 3 million Sudeten Germans. At the same time, in it, the Germans would have to refrain from supporting the property claims of the Sudeten Germans and commit themselves to the rapid compensation of the Czech victims of Nazism.

Such a declaration would be unacceptable to just under 30 percent of the 1,006 respondents. Roughly one in six does not know how he would decide.

The survey's conclusion indicates that people do not perceive Czech-German relations as dramatically as other surveys frequently suggest. That is, until now, the agencies have mainly only asked people whether the government should apologize officially to Germany for the postwar transfer of the Sudeten Germans. The majority of the public has always been opposed to such a unilateral step.

Furthermore, Stanislav Hampl of the Factum agency said that the selection of a formulation involving moral distancing has also played a positive role. "It is obvious that this expression is more acceptable to people than the word 'apology,'" declared Hampl.

It is also clear from the most recent survey that people who experienced the war themselves, and the manifestly left wing in particular, disagree with any form of settling relations. Young people and the right wing view the issue more practically.

The Foreign Ministry has not commented on the results of the survey. "Everything that concerns the declaration is confidential. We have agreed with the German side that we will not say anything about it during the course of the talks," said Karel Boruvka of the minist[illegible]press department. Minister Zielenec did not want to [illegible]ment on the survey until he had thoroughly familiarized himself with it. "It involves fine details; I cannot assess it on the street like this," he said in Prague yesterday, while on his way to a party meeting.

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Slovakia: Chief of Staff Discusses Army, NATO, Neutrality

AU2205125196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 May 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Jozef Tuchyna, Slovak Army chief of staff, by Pavol Vitko; place and date not given: "We Do Not Need To Take Stock of the Personnel"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Tuchyna] A total of 1,135 career soldiers left the Army in 1995. Some 750 career soldiers graduated from military schools and joined the Army. Approximately 350 career soldiers joined the Army from civilian professions on the basis of their own applications. It is a rather large turnover, which troubles us most at the lowest command level. I expect the new legislation to help stabilize the Army personnel. It should redefine the rights and duties of career soldier, and also his economic and social security.

[Vitko] Can you compare the system of personnel work in the Slovak Army with the standard in the neighboring states?

[Tuchyna] According to my sources, personnel practice in all neighboring states is similar to ours. There is a difference, however, in the pay of the career soldiers. With the single exception of Ukraine, we hold the shorter end of the stick.

[Vitko] Recently some reflections have been expressed by representatives of the Slovak National Party and Association of Workers of Slovakia coalition that negate the government-declared orientation of Slovakia to the transatlantic security structures. At the same time, the Army has been executing tasks that moved it toward close relations with NATO. Do you expect a change in strategic military and political planning in this regard?

[Tuchyna] NATO membership is an explicitly political matter. The government policy and the adopted program of foreign policy orientation is binding for the Slovak Army. It is orientation toward participation in the West European structures. The Slovak Army staff has demonstrated at various exercises within the framework of the Partnership for Peace that they can match the armies of the economically more advanced countries.

[Vitko] As a soldier-general, could you give us your opinion on the possibility of Slovak neutrality?

[Tuchyna] The question of a neutral Slovakia is also a political matter. It is not dealt with by the Army. Nevertheless, neutrality is not just a domestic political issue of the Republic. The political concept of dealing with fundamental security issues cannot be simplified. It cannot be segregated from the rest of the world. Only very good neighborly relations give a good guarantee of security. The Slovak Army has such relations.

Slovakia: Article Argues Against Joining NATO

AU2305115096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 May 96 p 8

[Article by Stefan Paulov: "Slovakia and NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Political events as such can be divided into two categories: Those that are above the publication surface, that is, events that are generally known and talked about and those that are nonpublic—they take place behind the scenes and in policy chambers. It is clear that the majority of events begin under the surface, in camera, and that only some of them make it above the publication surface. Is it possible to deduce at least some of the clandestine political steps? Of course, it is!

A Glance Into the Past

Let us examine the circumstances of our possible admission into NATO from such a point of view. I venture to hypothesize right at the start that NATO enlargement into Central Europe was an element of the original plan for the destruction of the Soviet empire and that, for example, the Chartist Prague dissident Mr. Havel and Mr. Carnogursky in Slovakia had been informed of it. Mr. Soros, in turn, kept them "under his thumb." How have I come to such a conclusion? Given a retrograde analysis of the facts from the end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's, it is possible to discern several interesting phenomena. When the Baltic states started to gain their independence, the whole world viewed this fact as a brave and heroic deed and no one ever stuck any disparaging labels on them. The independence of Slovenia and Croatia also proceeded smoothly, from the point of view of the reactions of the world and the powers. However, when the Slovaks, encouraged by this national emancipatory activity, began to talk about their own state, a dreadful disinformation campaign was unleashed against us in the world. They labeled us nationalists, chauvinists, fascists, communists... Why such a disparate attitude toward Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, and Croatia on the one hand and Slovakia on the other? The admission of these countries into NATO is not a hot topic of discussion at the moment. But, the CSFR [Czechoslovak Federative Republic] under Havel's leadership was oriented unequivocally toward the sphere of NATO.

Dissidents in Action

This was also one of the reasons that Mr. Dubcek was not "allowed" to be president—he was not part

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of the original plan. Remember the nervousness among the Chartist top brass when Dubcek's name began to be referred to in connection with the office of president. The breakup of the CSFR had not been envisaged; Slovakia's independence was a disturbing phenomenon in this plan. Therefore, world propaganda was also "formulated" in accordance with the scenario of Havel as God Almighty and the Slovaks again as the perpetrators of all the sins in the world. At this time, Mr. Havel received about 200 honorary doctorates in the West. Is he also so flooded with honors today as the Czech president? No. He is no longer so interesting for the West. He did not fulfill what had been expected of him. From this point of view, it is also possible to understand J. Carnogursky's fierce resistance to Slovak independence. He did not express his own views; he merely carried out foreign orders. In my opinion, he is still doing so today.

It is impossible to understand Havel's policy for converting the arms industry other than from this angle of vision. The destruction of the Slovak arms industry was our first specific contribution toward admission into NATO. The well-known screenings "games" also served this purpose. Namely, a state without secret services is far easier to manipulate. Thus, it is possible to understand better the apparent paradox that all of the Czechoslovakist and anti-Slovak oriented political parties, movements, and associations enjoyed general international support, although their domestic influence was very often negligible. This phenomenon continues to this day and, along with the shunning of the pronational political groupings on the international scene, is one of the forms of aggressive pressure on Slovakia. No one, however, is bothered by the nationalism of the Slovak Hungarians.

The KDH Only in the Opposition?

Unfortunately, or possibly fortunately, however, we did not allow ourselves to be deterred from the path of our statehood; therefore, it was necessary to change the tactics toward us. The West accepted the breakup of the CSFR and the establishment of the Slovak Republic, but a great deal of noise began to be made about our orientation toward Russia and the danger of a return to totalitarianism. Who unleashed it!? Surely not the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and the posthumous children of the VPN [Public Against Violence Movement] close to Havel and Charter 77? These were all absurd allegations, but they fulfilled their purpose. In essence, even under the new conditions, we did not have a chance of acting differently. Merely of kow-towing in a groveling, servile fashion to the West and of promising day in day out that we want very much to get into its structures. I have already referred to why it was necessary to destroy the CSFR's secret services... And, I ask just in passing: Does the issue in Slovakia now not involve the destruction of the Slovak Information Service? And, is perhaps the most important role in this campaign not being played by Carnogursky's right-hand man—General Pittner? And, if we give further flight to our fancy, the following question certainly comes to mind: Is Mr. Pittner acting of his own volition or is he merely carrying out more orders? Has he not already admitted publicly to having contacts with foreign secret services?

At the beginning of the 1990's, there was an outburst of general mass media euphoria at the definitive world peace. The process of disarmament in Europe, including the elimination of nuclear weapons, was also moving ahead at full speed. This process, however, was somewhat asymmetrical. While Soviet forces were withdrawn from Central Europe, the Americans did not close down even one military base. NATO did, admittedly, also eliminate part of its nuclear arsenal; however, this was merely a well thought out move on its part. It removed some of its nuclear weapons from Germany with the prospect that, in the near future, it would spread them even further toward the east, into the countries of the future members of the North Atlantic Pact all the way to the borders of the nuclear-free Ukraine. It is obvious that the disarming process in Central Europe and the denuclearization of Ukraine are connected very closely and that this was an element of the original plan. It was necessary to establish a nuclear-free zone in Ukraine in order to eradicate these deadly weapons from the borders of the future empire.

Questions and Question Marks

Many readers are surely asking why the North Atlantic Pact is interested in us. I see four main reasons:

—Few territorial-political ideas correspond as much with the concept for "suppressing communism" as the plan for enlarging NATO toward the east.

—Every power in the history of mankind has conducted itself—and still conducts itself—in an imperial fashion. It wants to control as much territory as possible and to extend its power steadily, regardless of the circumstances. Therefore, China will never give up Taiwan, Russia will never give up Chechnya, and Britain will never give up the Malvinas [Falkland Islands] or Northern Ireland. Military groupings behave in the same way.

—The borders of a dominion, empire, or military pact are also the borders of possible military clashes. If the countries of Central Europe are admitted into NATO, the West will shift this zone of risk from its territory

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further toward the east. In the event of a catastrophic scenario, that is, a conflict between NATO and another adversary, the battle would be conducted on our territory and our country and population would suffer the most. Nothing has in fact changed; only the world has been turned upside down. Or: While we were in the Warsaw Pact, the Warsaw Pact command reckoned that we would be the decisive battleground; following our admission into NATO, its headquarters will, in turn, allow for the same option.

—If NATO were to decide to enlarge itself by the V-4 [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary] countries, the position of Slovakia would be quite specific, because it is the only one of these states that borders the other three. In Hungary's case, the Slovak Republic is its only neighbor [from the V-4]. It is clear that our presence in NATO is important for Hungary. So, our potential rejection of membership would make its entry very difficult. Or: With the loss of one state—the Slovak Republic—NATO would virtually lose two states, Slovakia and Hungary.

After this analysis, we come to the final question of whether it is in fact advantageous to join NATO. I will cite several reasons why we should not do so:

—The most important fact is, that by entering into NATO, we would be surrendering ourselves unconditionally to the sphere of influence of one power. Slovakia, as part of the CSR [Czechoslovak Republic], has already paid dearly for this three times this century. The first time was in 1938 as part of the First Republic, when Benes's policy was unequivocally and unconditionally oriented toward Britain and France. The second time was under the first Slovak Republic, which was oriented toward Hitler's Germany. And, the third time was 1968, when we paid with the Soviet occupation for our blind trust. The West has let us down twice, the East once; true, this abuse of power functions regardless of the global parties involved. If we make the same mistake for a fourth time, it will just be a matter of time until we pay for it.

—Are our interests really identifiable with NATO's interests? Are we willing, in the event of a military conflict in Europe, to take on the role of battlefield? I heard a comment made recently by a Western politician that the Slovak Republic is an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the middle of Europe. Is this to be our prospect? If NATO gets into a conflict outside of Europe—in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, and so on—will we send our sons to fight and die there? This notion is not merely hypothetical! Let us remember how zestfully President Havel dispatched Czechoslovak troops to the war in the Persian Gulf. One of our soldiers died there... On whose behalf?

—If by our nonparticipation in NATO we "bring about" the nonadmission of Hungary, we will weaken considerably the influence of this country in Central Europe. Hungary will be far less attractive for the West, which, vice versa, will strengthen our position.

A Black-and-White View

I see the only chance for the Slovak Republic's long-term stability in the Central European region in a policy of balancing influences, regardless of the global parties involved. They will neutralize one another on our territory. Only well-balanced influence between powers will prevent a dominant power from turning us into a sacrificial lamb the moment it itself is in difficulty. Our doctrine should be cooperation with all of our partners in the economic and military spheres. I consider the opinions that we have only two choices—to orient ourselves toward the East or the West—to be a remnant of the black-and-white bipolar view of the world and a sign of the inability or, as the case may be, unwillingness to formulate and adopt new nonstandard solutions.

Slovakia: Anger in National Council Over SIS Head's Report

LD2205132496 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 22 May 96

[Report by editors Lydia Mrazova and Michal Tvarozek from the National Council session in Bratislava]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tvarozek] Intelligence Service [SIS] Director Ivan Lexa began to read his report to the Council on the work of the SIS after 1200. His first attempt had failed because some opposition deputies loudly expressed their opposition to the SIS director's presence in parliament.

In fact, they are expressing their opposition even now, while he is reading his report. To start with, Lexa said that the report was amended because he had to observe official secrecy and could not read the unamended version in public.

Perhaps you can hear—although our microphones may not be very sensitive—some of the opposition deputies banging desks while the report is being read out.

Some 10 deputies, who are holding posters, literally besieged Ivan Lexa on the rostrum. I am looking through a small window and can read what they say: Prison for crimes; Get out of parliament; Shame on Lexa; and so on.

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On one hand we are witnessing applause for his remarks, and on the other hand we can hear banging and shouting: StB, StB [former state security].

[Mrazova] Deputies from the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]—or Joint Choice to be precise [opposition coalition between the SDL, Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, Green Party in Slovakia, and Farmers' Movement in Slovakia] left the hall a while ago. I managed to find out that they went to the deputies' club room to listen to the report in more acceptable conditions. The deputies from the Joint Choice parliamentary group would like to discuss what action should be taken next.

[Tvarozek] It was difficult to hear all of the report. We have recorded part of it and we will play it for you now—the part about our domestic political and security situation.

[Begin recording] [Lexa] At the moment, several organized crime groups are operating in Slovakia and internationally. They are directly threatening the economy, the state's foreign policy, and the security of the population. These groups come mainly from Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya, Italy, former Yugoslavia, Albania, and China. They trade in arms and drugs, are engaged in illegal border crossings, organized prostitution, and money laundering.

The SIS is gathering information about the illegal activities of these groups and giving it to bodies responsible for criminal proceedings. To recall some successful cases, I would like to mention the thwarting of a planned attack by a prominent Calabrian mafioso, Branco D. while he was awaiting trial in the Palace of Justice; the arrest of a number of illegal border crossing guides; as well as people brought across the Slovak border from other states.

As for terrorism and activities connected with the preparation of politically motivated violence, one cannot talk about developed forms in Slovakia.

[Unidentified speaker from the floor] One can.

[Lexa] But in the past two years there have been cases which, by their nature, remind one of terrorism. I am talking, for example, about explosions in cars as an accompanying phenomenon of the power struggle in the underworld.

But we have not noted any direct international terrorist attack in Slovakia so far. [end recording]

[Tvarozek] This was a part of the report being delivered, in a stormy atmosphere, by SIS head Ivan Lexa.

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Hungary: Defense Official on NATO Compatibility Issue

AU2205181096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, deputy state secretary at the Defense Ministry, by Attila Seres; place and date not given: "NATO Compatibility Is Not Only a Matter of Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For Hungary, it is of vital importance to get into the first round of NATO expansion. That way it would get into a well-defined group of countries that will be admitted, Istvan Gyarmati, newly appointed deputy state secretary at the Defense Ministry, told NEPSZABADSAG. He will occupy his office within the coming days. In his new position, he will be dealing with security policy issues and the issue of NATO integration. The Bratislava veto of his appointment as OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] general secretary is not a conflict for him, rather, this step describes Slovakia.

[Seres] Does this mean that you are not leaving the Foreign Ministry with bad feelings?

[Gyarmati] I am only leaving temporarily, and I will actually be dealing with another aspect of the same task. An organization has been set up both in the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry to coordinate integration activities. The integration state secretariat led by Ferenc Somogyi represents governmental interests as well as the ministry's interests, while the Defense Ministry institution that I run does not have such a broad authority, but stays within the limits of the ministry.

[Seres] Will there be no overlap or competition between the two organizations?

[Gyarmati] Overlap perhaps, but definitely no competition. I am convinced that NATO integration is only possible if we have a suitable army. However, I do not think that an interoperable army in itself would be able to take us into the organization; other conditions also need to be met. At the same time, if all the admission conditions are met but our army is not at the necessary level, we will still not be admitted.

[Seres] According to some people, our NATO compatibility is only a matter of money.

[Gyarmati] This is a rather widespread misconception, and its purpose probably is for some people to try—unsuccessfully—to increase the military budget. On the other hand, I find it dangerous not to do anything, using the argument that there is no money. In the interest of compatibility, we are expected to be able to cooperate. This assumes a good level of English at the various levels of military commanders, and we also have to communicate with each other with respect to the equipment. It assumes the establishment of compatible command structures, and we have to have the same military philosophy as our partners. We must have the ability to participate in NATO's various activities and to receive NATO assistance. The latter is mainly a matter of infrastructure. In this respect, we are not in a bad position, for example, we have more airports than what could be needed by a national army. This is an asset with which we can enrich NATO's defense abilities. We need to assess if we should select, let us say, two brigades a year and bring them up to NATO level, rather than equally distributing the otherwise tight military budget.

[Seres] In connection with EU integration, from time to time a prediction is made that we will not be in the first round. Does NATO admission seem simpler?

[Gyarmati] This issue is much tougher in NATO's case. The first round will mean a well-defined group of countries, and these will obviously be admitted. Being left out of the first round of NATO expansion would probably be a bigger failure than being left out of EU integration. It cannot yet be predicted who will be in the first group, although if the decision were made today, Hungary would obviously be in it. However, this cannot mean self-satisfaction; in a year's time, at the expected time of the decision, we will have to be in a position similar to today.

[Seres] Your nomination for OSCE general secretary was vetoed. How did you react to this?

[Gyarmati] I certainly did not see it as a failure. It was a great satisfaction that the Russians, Americans, British, French, and virtually half the world supported me, and Slovakia was left on its own with its veto. With this, Bratislava probably did more harm to itself than to me.

Hungary: Simonyi on Fighter Plane Purchase, NATO Conditions

AU2305083796 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 22 May 96 p 9

[Interview with Ambassador Andras Simonyi, head of the Brussels Hungarian Atlantic Connection Office, by Eva Elekes; place and date not given: "NATO Does Not Insist on What Type of Fighter Planes To Buy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Elekes] What is NATO's stance regarding the fighter plane purchasing plans of the central European countries which are applying for admission?

[Simonyi] In the document on the conditions of admission, NATO did not make any concrete reference to

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what kind of weapons the various countries should acquire. At the same time, NATO also made it clear that structural compatibility and a minimal interoperability are conditions of membership. Therefore, at the moment of admission, they do not expect Hungary's full armament and all structures to be fully adjusted to NATO's structure. They expect an overall reform to be started whose final result will be full compatibility. The areas where technical development is needed will have to be defined. The current dialogue will help us in this.

[Elekes] Has no stance been taken at official forums on the issue of fighter purchases?

[Simonyi] NATO has never once said that we should buy this or that type of plane. What they did say—and this is obvious—is that in the long run Hungary has to have an adequately modern armed force.

[Elekes] On the basis of what criteria should Hungary make its decision?

[Simonyi] It has to assess political, economic, financial, and integration considerations and Hungary's long-term—meaning not five-to-10-year—interests. The Hungarians are constantly trying to make it clear that we do not wish to give privilege to or to exclude any of the countries as possible suppliers. This also means that Hungary cannot join NATO by committing itself in advance to, or against, this or that type of purchases. Hungary appears on the market, which is very big, as a buyer, it will examine all criteria, and will make the decision that is most advantageous for itself. NATO has not given any indication that would prejudice this decision. NATO does not prescribe such conditions either for members or for peace partners. I expect that we will never receive a stipulation from NATO that we must buy this or that type of weapon or plane. I would like to make it clear that Hungary's arms purchases are regulated by the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] agreement on European conventional weapons and, according to this, we buy the type of weapon we wish.

[Elekes] Were only general principles expressed also at the 16+1 Hungary-NATO talks that summarize the results of the peace partnership cooperation?

[Simonyi] At these talks it was discussed what programs Hungary wants to participate in and what programs it needs. One of the topics was how we could approximate our purchases in connection with military management to NATO's standards but this again contains procedures rather than prescriptions. NATO helps in that when we buy weapons they should meet the democratic structure and civilian control, namely they should be controlled. On the other hand, it helps in the sense that the purchases should meet NATO's standards.

[Elekes] Are any informal talks in progress on the fighter plane purchases?

[Simonyi] Very many things are discussed informally and I, as ambassador, am also approached, not by NATO but by various—very many—companies in connection with all purchases. We are approached by companies rather than governments or member states. In my view, this is good because there is an interest in Hungary as a consumer and it also means that we get offers on reasonable conditions.

[Elekes] The Czech and Polish sides would like our countries to coordinate their information in connection with the offers on fighter planes. Is there such a coordination in Brussels?

[Simonyi] Not in connection with fighter planes, this is not our task. Naturally, we have coordination on very many other issues with the Czech and Polish colleagues, but we have not had any talks on this issue in Brussels. My opinion is that it is good to consult and to cooperate.

Hungary: Foreign Spokesman Views Talks With Romania

AU2305081296 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 22 May 96 pp 1, 9

[Article by Ferenc Garzo: "Budapest Is Not Being Stubborn"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the talks on the four Hungarian-Romanian documents, it is possible to make fast progress on the general issues, but the Romanian side is not showing any willingness to progress in the national minority and human rights issues, foreign affairs spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi said at the news conference on 21 May. Szentivanyi recalled that at the talks held at state secretarial level, the sides had agreed to handle the four documents as a package. It is not possible just to sign two of them and "sweep the rest under the carpet," he said.

Szentivanyi mentioned some Romanian statements made in the past 10 days which do not appear to reflect any kind of constructive spirit. We cannot know the reason for this, they do not ensure a political background that will establish a constructive atmosphere, perhaps because of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty's coming into force or because of the Romanian elections, Szentivanyi explained.

He added: While the Romanian Foreign Ministry plays the role of the "good boy" and emphasizes their willingness to agree in the international arena, various sources

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make statements according to which Hungary is "being stubborn."

Szentivanyi also condemned the fact that Bucharest talks about "separation and segregation" in connection with the attitude of Hungarians in Romania; these are rather unfriendly terms, he emphasized.

Answering another question, Szentivanyi said that the fact that the basic treaty has been ratified and the documents have been exchanged promotes the process in the framework of which high level contacts can be started between the two countries. A Horn-Meciar meeting has been mentioned, but no decision has yet been made either on the venue or the time. Szentivanyi does not think it impossible that the meeting might take place before the middle of the summer. [passage omitted]

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F-H: Klickovic Visits Brcko, Comments on Refugees

LD2205174996 Brcko Srpska Radio-Televizija Radio Brcko in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, and his colleagues paid a working visit to Brcko today. The meeting in the Brcko municipal assembly was also attended by Minister of Refugee Affairs Ljubisa Vladusic; Minister of Agriculture Djojo Arsenovic; Minister of Education Nedeljko Rasula; and Milenko Karisik, deputy minister of internal affairs. Thus, this was a sort of government meeting involving ministers responsible for tackling current political problems.

The meeting was also attended by all local representatives of the authorities and municipal authorities responsible for the accommodation and welfare of refugees.

The basic topic discussed at the meeting was the law on abandoned property, the implementation of which, according to Prime Minister Klickovic, is one of the priorities both of the state and municipal authorities.

This is one of the first working visits of the new prime minister to a municipality, and the arrival of such high-ranking government members is an indication of the fact that Brcko is of primary importance to the Serb Republic, but it also testifies to the importance of the welfare of refugees and displaced persons, about which Prime Minister Klickovic spoke in his introductory address.

[Begin Klickovic recording] These talks, and ultimately our agreement, should speed up the resolution of the tasks facing us, so I propose that we discuss the most topical problems. This, above all, is the law on abandoned property, the law on refugees and displaced persons, and also, very importantly, the third thing is the relocation of the Bijeljina security center from Bijeljina to Brcko. We shall probably also discuss other issues, but I would like us to concentrate on these things. [passage omitted]

The aim is to establish the government's duties, on the one hand—and this certainly includes those of the relevant ministries—and the duties of the municipal authorities on the other. So after today's negotiations it will be clear who has what duties. We shall also establish a timetable and priorities for the carrying out of these obligations by these two sides.

I hope that after this, for the first time, either side can be held responsible if these priorities and duties are not carried out. After all, the government is responsible for calling people to account and replacing them, etc.

At the assembly session, I said that Brcko was our top strategic priority. This is not because we should fear arbitration over Brcko. The Dayton agreement clearly says that Brcko is not a disputed border area, and this illusion should be dispelled and the idea forgotten once and for all. There is no dispute over Brcko. The dispute is, instead, over one part of the border in the Brcko area, and we should ignore the fact that international organizations and mediators are complaining that the Serbs from Sarajevo are being accommodated in Brcko, etc. We are doing these things on our own territory and we have an obligation to find accommodation for all Serbs whom we can accept and accommodate in this area.

Any such attempt or mode of negotiation with these international representatives should immediately be boycotted and rejected. So there can be no discussion on the topic of Brcko. Talks can take place on one part of the border, and these talks will be conducted by the state commissions, which have already completed most of the work on the borders. [end recording]

In a very fruitful discussion, which lasted almost four hours and in which all ministers as well as representatives of the local authorities took part, a great deal of information came to light on the problems encountered so far in implementing the law on abandoned property. The general conclusion was that work could and should be carried out more effectively and rapidly, and responsibility for this should be borne equally by both the state and local authorities. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosnian Serb PM Questions IFOR Role in Brcko Area

LD2205224396 Brcko Srpska Radio-Televizija Radio Brcko in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dear listeners, as announced we have a special additional item in today's news bulletin. We are broadcasting the concluding address by Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic, at a joint meeting in Brcko today of part of the government and members of the municipal authorities. The following has been prepared by Marina Pjevalica-Zorz:

[Begin Klickovic recording from poor reception] I propose that we [words indistinct] draw certain conclusions in which [words indistinct] cabinet, government, and it will be sent here with the aim of later establishing deadlines for some of these conclusions. At present we are not in a position to determine deadlines, because we have to familiarize ourselves with the financial situation, the situation with the budget, and we have to ascertain from certain ministries what they can do because (?they

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will be involved in the projects) we have negotiated today.

Above all, it should be said that Brcko municipality has so far taken in 29,000 displaced Serbs or Serb refugees from all areas, and no one can say that Brcko municipality has not opened its heart and made every effort to meet the needs of Serbs who have arrived and who wish to remain in this area. [passage omitted]

A big task for the government is to get the appropriate ministries and state authorities to halt the process of the gradual occupation of (?Dizdarus and Omerbegovac) by the Implementation Force [IFOR]. We have to ask whether IFOR is here to transport building materials to the Muslims or whether it is here to implement the provisions of the Dayton agreement.

One of the additional factors of stability will be the relocation of the Bijeljina police station from Bijeljina to Brcko. This has been agreed and I believe that my colleagues, those headed by Minister Kijac, have already begun preparations in Bijeljina, and that Assistant Internal Affairs Minister Karisik has been working on this and he will have something to say on this.

Next, just to say in principle—some activities are under way and I know a little and I will find out more—that the Ministry of Internal Affairs must place Loncari and Srebrenica [as heard] under its control by any means. The Ministry of Agriculture must also tackle the (?sale) of livestock in this area, and I believe that this will best be solved by the creation of a joint veterinary and hygiene inspectorate, for the purpose of preventing the sale of livestock and with the aim of inspecting goods (?which are leaving the area). [passage omitted]

I believe that the media—local, regional, and republic-wide media—must report on every part of this action, especially as it relates to Brcko. If need be, every day [words indistinct] these municipal authorities, these commissions. Each arrival of semifinished raw materials and building material should be reported, and we should give this broad coverage and let people know that here. [end recording]

B-H: Krajisnik Interviewed on Referendum on Serb Leadership

LD2205220296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2053 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 22 May (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, has said that the proposed referendum on support for the state leadership and its policy is a "test for and offer to the international community, which wanted to interfere in many of our state affairs, in contravention of the Dayton agreement."

In an interview for tomorrow's issue of Banja Luka's GLAS SRPSKI, Krajisnik confirmed that Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community, and his aides had been told about the possibility of a referendum.

"Instead of a reply, they told us their view that it could be understood as a coup against the Dayton agreement," the speaker of the People's Assembly said, stressing that the "policy of the Serb Republic, which was officially presented to the international community, entirely fits in with the framework of the Dayton agreement."

Krajisnik believes that the West has a good understanding of what the Serb people want, which is why it is reacting in this way to the possibility of a referendum.

"With all responsibility I can say that Mr. Karadzic is not in the least concerned about whether he or someone else is in power. The only thing that it is important is that the people and the leadership are as one because we have a large number of enemies," the assembly speaker said.

He said that "a referendum would be a kind of people's reply at a specific point in time, if it is assessed that the Serb Republic is under threat."

Commenting on a statement by Rajko Kasagic, former prime minister of the Serb Republic, that there were no arguments about strategic questions of the state's survival between himself and Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic, Krajisnik replied:

"Mr. Kasagic is a member of the Serb Democratic Party and he is one of us. He has certainly made mistakes, but we do not write off our people, nor do we wish to destroy people who have made mistakes."

Assessing that the enemies of the Serb Republic tried to politicize the normal procedure of replacing the prime minister, Krajisnik said the final judgment on and assessment of Kasagic's work would be made by the Serb Republic's parliament.

B-H: Kasagic-Karadzic Power Struggle Viewed

AU2205193796 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 96 pp 8-9

[Article by Vlastimir Mijovic: "Karadzic Scores His Own Goal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that Rajko Kasagic took Dayton very seriously—unluckily for him, because the genuine implementation of the peace agreement was never part of Radovan Karadzic's plan. It is unlikely

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that Kasagic did not know that, just as he did not know about the Dayton provision that the Pale leader ought to be delivered to the Tribunal for War Crimes. It is more likely, though, that the Banja Luka lawyer counted on that, so he pretended—as much as he could—in front of Karadzic, to work following his instructions, while actually trying, through a back door, to do the part of the job that Dayton requires the Serbian entity to do. Anyway, the crook from Mt. Durmitor saw through Kasagic's game, and immediately removed him from his political environment.

These possible causes of the big brawl in Pale, in which Kasagic ended up stripped of his function as prime minister, is favored by those analysts who see in Banja Luka's Kasagic a force of reason among the authorities of the Bosnian Serbs. A surprising thing is, though, that there are many such people. Moreover, this has to do with important international factors that at the same time are guarantors of the implementation of the peace agreement.

At a casual glance the message issued by Bildt's office in Sarajevo sounds childish, with its spokesman declaring Karadzic's decision irregular and unacceptable, and announcing that the international administrator will continue cooperation with the ousted prime minister. How are they supposed to cooperate with him at all, if he really lost, as he did, the administrative authority and capacity to influence the work of the government in the Serb Republic? What is behind these implicit threats to Karadzic, whose right to oust Kasagic is denied by Bonn, Washington, Paris, London, and even by Belgrade? Even Milosevic publicly assessed this removal as "unlawful and invalid."

It is at this stage now that the game should become really complicated. It is not over when Karadzic says it is, but when the whistle is blown by the international arbiters. And it seems that they see in Kasagic's removal only the beginning of a long-awaited process: Karadzic's removal from Pale's presidential lounge and his transfer to the Hague bench of shame.

Self-Proclaimed President

In such an extremely delicate situation, Karadzic happens to be alone against the rest of the world. The world powers, and even Belgrade, are unanimous in scolding him, and it also happened that a high officer in the Serb entity, although motivated by his own removal, publicly questioned Karadzic's presidential legitimacy. Kasagic claimed that "Karadzic was not elected by people, as is anticipated by the constitution, but by the parliament, which is also self-proclaimed." By this, Kasagic has actually declared war on Karadzic, a war in which, considering the current situation, he could get full support from Belgrade and the world powers, which are the sponsors of the Dayton agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For a war, one needs palpable arguments and means. At this moment, they are in Kasagic's hands. However, Karadzic is still the indisputable chief of the Serb entity, for he holds in his hands both the military and the political-administrative trump cards. If it had been otherwise, Kasagic would have ousted Karadzic, particularly as he considers him to be an illegitimate president. In all this, the crucial question is where the ouster happened. It happened in Pale, in Karadzic's stronghold, where the Mt. Durmitor highlander makes decisions even on how the grass will grow. In return, Kasagic's political, and probably other kind of strength is in Banja Luka. As soon as he stepped on the ground on which he felt more secure, he delivered a severe criticism at Karadzic's expense, and showed that in this game he does not intend to fight only a single round.

In the brawl that will obviously continue, Kasagic may count on European, American, and Belgrade seconds. Still, they can only advise and encourage him to try to knock out the so far dominant Karadzic, but they cannot execute the knockout themselves. True, perhaps they can do it by organizing a commando raid on Karadzic's bunker, and his arrest and transfer to The Hague, but this option does not sound quite credible. The tyrant from Pale can be eliminated only by his internal political opponents—in a statutory or nonstatutory way, through elections or armed rebellion. However, to achieve this one needs to fulfill two necessary preconditions: to make the Dayton, anti-Karadzic option take root in the Serb entity, and acquire political, military, and diplomatic dominance over the Pale clique, which has been indisputable so far.

The first precondition has been met, at least verbally. Over the past six months, Kasagic acquired a reputation of "reasonable force," according to assessments of competent international circles, that is, as the leader of a political trend that tends to fulfill the Serb commitments emanating from the Dayton accord. This alone has placed him on the opposite side to Karadzic, for whom it is clear that he will not be implementing the Dayton accord, because that would mean his transfer to The Hague. It seems that Karadzic was quite positive that Kasagic would not go too far in that respect, and that he would only declare his dedication to the peace agreement, while in reality, as Karadzic himself put it, remaining on the same line with the Serb Republic's policy that aims at the preservation of the statehood acquired in Dayton. It seems he was wrong in this point, though. As soon as he set foot in Banja Luka, the ousted prime minister stated that "he told Karadzic on several occasions that they could not ask for more than

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is provided by the Dayton accord, which is that the Serb Republic in an integral part of Bosnia-Herzegovina." A logical conclusion drawn from these words by Kasagic, although not clearly stated, is that Karadzic would in fact have to go to The Hague, because that is required by the Dayton accord, and that the dream of a separate Serbian state within Bosnia would have to be forgotten.

A Crack in the Monolith

So it could happen that we will soon witness a long-awaited and desired, and probably inevitable, major internal conflict in Pale. One's desires and sense of justice, which require that criminals answer for their atrocities, still must not fog the view of the real situation and the power structure among conflicting trends. Karadzic and his clique still have an indisputable advantage. In the last five years they cemented their power not only through a military-police regime of terror, but also by moves with which they dragged into their criminal, nationalist-chauvinist play the masses as well. In the meantime, a crack appeared in the monolith of their power, but it is not yet so big as to seriously endanger Karadzic's power, although it is clear that the number of his opponents has considerably increased. Karadzic's opponents, who are insufficiently strong in the Serb Republic, need decisive and abundant aid from abroad, which may tip the scales of power to their advantage. Thereby, we refer to the world superpowers, which are the guarantors of the Dayton accord, but even more to the tutors over the Drina River—Belgrade and Milosevic.

These days we have been witness to an unprecedented outpour of international wrath, provoked by Kasagic's removal. Karadzic's move has been assessed as an assault on Dayton, as a challenge to the international community. The Europeans and the Americans have seriously threatened to accept the challenge, in other words, to attack Karadzic. Unfortunately, we are afraid that sharp words will not be followed by equally sharp actions, as has been the case many times so far. After all, the international community had many reasons to attack Karadzic before, even without the challenge of Kasagic's removal. Were not monstrous atrocities a motive good enough to put the criminal behind bars, where he belongs?

Milosevic's intentions are also doubtful. Is he not hiding in his own house similar criminals, like Mrksic, Sljivancanin, Arkan...? His reason for turning his back on Karadzic and helping Kasagic is found only in his unsettled accounts with the Pale leader, who refuses to acknowledge Milosevic's political supremacy. In fact, Milosevic himself—not only in view of his refusal to extradite persons indicted for war crimes—works against Dayton. Therefore, his support for Kasagic has a seamy side as well: Milosevic would not quite support a man who is as dedicated to Dayton as Kasagic claims to be.

The ousted prime minister has earned the attributes showered on him these days by prominent foreign politicians more by his resistance to Karadzic's extreme policy, rather than by real, concrete devotion to the Dayton-styled Bosnia. When praising Kasagic, international arbiters start from the minimalist choice between bad and worse. The strategy is obviously aimed at achieving the elimination of Karadzic at any price, without being picky about the one who does that. Thereby Dayton would come closer to Bosnia, though it would not get established there until the man called Radovan Karadzic is not.

One should not foster illusions that the Serb entity would return to mother Bosnia as soon as the Durmitor brute disappears. But the chances of that will considerably increase if the man who thinks that life consists of graves and crime is eliminated. Perhaps Kasagic is the hard nut that Karadzic will eventually break his teeth on. He has ousted the disobedient prime minister in order to prevent his own disaster, but it may be that he has thereby only speeded it up.

B-H: Karadzic Comments on Dayton, Elections, Hague Tribunal

BR2205150096 Brussels KNACK in Dutch 22-28 May 96 pp 136-137

[Interview with Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic by Johan Verheyden in Pale; date not given: "At the Request of the People—An Indictment Has Been Issued Against Bosnian Serb President and Probably Soon-Presidential Candidate Radovan Karadzic for War Crimes—A Message From Pale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Bosnian-Serb President Radovan Karadzic dismissed his Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic on 8 May. Kasagic refused to be dismissed because Karadzic was "appointed" president and not legally elected. Both Carl Bildt, UN representative for the reconstruction of Bosnia, and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, continue to recognize Kasagic as the prime minister of the ethnic Serbs and as interlocutor in the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. Later in the week, Karadzic installed the more obedient Gojko Klickovic as prime minister—someone from the hard liners—and transferred some of his functions. Subsequently, reports circulated about the imminent resignation of the president. In any case, Karadzic regards himself as the driving force of the peace agreement.*

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[Karadzic] The entire Dayton agreement would not have been carried out without the support of myself or General Ratko Mladic. Often I have personally ordered the commanders on the ground to follow NATO's demands. Some people like to think that they implemented the peace agreement without me. I tell you: The peace agreement is more or less a success, because I worked for it personally. We Serbs find it difficult to accept the unacceptable, but if we give our word, we stick to it. No matter how hard it turns out for us.

[Verheyden] You do not seem to be very happy with the Dayton agreement.

[Karadzic] I am not happy with the agreement, but I am with the peace. Dayton gave us what the EU proposed to us as a solution in Lisbon in 1992. If the Muslims had not walked away then, the war would not have been necessary. We fought for three and a half years for nothing.

I do not agree with a large number of the aspects of the agreement, but I am determined to implement it and never to fight again. In military terms, I mean.

[Verheyden] Can a new war be avoided?

[Karadzic] Every war can be avoided. All three parties have to be treated equally, be made equally happy or unhappy. However, what I do not understand is that the Muslim demands for Bosnia are taken seriously, while the Serbs and Croats together form a Christian majority. Neither the Muslims, nor the Serbs, nor Croats, have the right to dominate all of Bosnia.

Once Bosnia was entirely Serbian, but history has changed that. Before the war we owned 64 percent of the land, but I knew that people would never give us so much. We did not want to leave Yugoslavia, but if we are forced to, then we demand our own ethnic state in Bosnia. The EU offered us that as well. The Republika Srpska is a reality now, it is the child of the European Community. The Muslims will just have to learn that they cannot make a claim on all of Bosnia.

[Verheyden] In a few months there will be elections in Bosnia. Will you be president again?

[Karadzic] I was not a candidate in 1990 when the first free elections took place in Bosnia. I was leader of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. Only when the conflict erupted did I follow the people's will, and I was literally sucked into politics. I was exceptionally happy as a psychiatrist and poet, but I did what the people asked and I will do that again. No one is served by chaos. As long as the SDS and I are in control, then we can guarantee order. But the people will decide whether I should be a candidate or not.

[Verheyden] The international community says that you, as a war criminal, are not eligible for election.

[Karadzic] Perhaps they are doing me a good service. Once again, I was extremely happy outside politics, but the well-being of the people comes first. It is not very democratic to declare someone guilty who is only accused and to prevent him from taking part in democratic elections. If my people are against me, then let my people vote me out.

[Verheyden] For the time being, the world seems to only want to do business with the more moderate ethnic Serbs, like Kasagic.

[Karadzic] Kasagic is only following the orders of Parliament. Sometimes he does that well, sometimes not. He is new in politics and still rather clumsy. He talks too much.

We do not want the Dayton agreement to change. Sometimes it seems as if the international community is regretting that plan and wants to tinker with it. Kasagic sometimes seems to be following that line. Why must we live together with Muslims, while, in the Middle East, Jews and Muslims are kept apart? That is the right solution. Better to be good neighbors than forced to live together. Today the world has made Sarajevo into a European Tehran. The European-orientated Muslims will not resist fundamentalism, nor the drugs, violence, and terrorism which are linked with it.

[Verheyden] The international war crimes tribunal has issued an indictment against you. Are you afraid of being arrested?

[Karadzic] Do I look afraid? In any case, it will not be easy to get me to The Hague. And then, what would happen there? There is no evidence against me at all. I did everything to prevent atrocities: The proof can be found in our media, in our official journal.

On 20 May 1992 our Army was formed and on 13 June of that year I ordered everyone—in the strongest terms—to respect the international laws and Geneva Conventions. I told my generals that they were personally responsible for atrocities committed by their soldiers. I myself did everything to prevent atrocities against civilians. No one can prove that commanders gave orders for mass murder, expulsions, and genocide. What we did was defend ourselves. Genocide is not a myth: It happened to us, the Serbs, in World War II and to a degree in World War I. It could have happened again.

[Verheyden] If you are innocent, why do you not go to The Hague—like Croatian General Tihomir Blaskic?

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[Karadzic] If I had faith in the war crimes tribunal, I would go, or I would accept a kind of trial through television. But I have no faith in The Hague. The main crime—that against peace—is not being prosecuted there. Who started the war? Who walked away from the negotiating table in Lisbon? The Muslims!

All these stories about rapes: outrageous. They claim that 80,000 women were raped several times. So where are the children born out of these rapes? There are none! I have not yet seen the indictment—no one has brought it to me. But my lawyers tell me that it all remains rather vague. In the style of: "In Zvornik some Muslims were killed by Serbs and Karadzic is commander in chief of the Serbs...."

[Verheyden] An increasing amount of evidence is piling up. For example, in Srebrenica. Mass graves have been found there. Are the Serbs not responsible for them?

[Karadzic] I ordered that these rumors be investigated, but from the oral reports there is no evidence of mass graves and genocide. What is possible is that civilians took revenge there. In the weeks before the fall of Srebrenica, organized Muslim gangs broke out of the enclaves and went to steal cows in the neighboring Serbian villages. Serbian cows. Perhaps the villagers took revenge on Muslims. But a planned extermination by our soldiers: That is Muslim propaganda. Mladic and I ordered our troops to leave the civilian population in peace. That could be seen on television.

[Verheyden] In your previous life you were a psychiatrist in Sarajevo. Could you give a psychological profile of yourself?

[Karadzic] I am no longer in contact with my therapist and my professors at the university, and I have not practiced for six years. I am once again full of complexes and sins, I should talk with my analyst again to get a better understanding of myself again.

[Verheyden] Why do Serbs always feel they are the underdogs?

[Karadzic] That is not a neurosis on our part, but an absolute reality. We have a terrible history behind us. Once we had an enormous kingdom with a great culture. In Europe, when they were still living in caves, our princes were eating with golden cutlery. For 500 years we were under the Turks' heels. We liberated ourselves and the other southern Slav people. We formed a state together and then the Croats and Slovenes turned against us. We forgave them and once again formed a state. Until World War II, when they destroyed our Yugoslavia and killed 700,000 Serbs. In 1945 we agreed to live with them again. In Croatia in 1991 the third wave of hatred broke out against Serbia.

In Yugoslavia we were the biggest people, suddenly we became a national minority. Why should we feel good: Without a country, threatened by yet another genocide?

[Verheyden] The international community is forcing the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to work together. Is that creating a link?

[Karadzic] The relationship between Serbs and Croats is improving. The Muslims are unjustly afraid of that: If the relations between two peoples are good, then a third partner can do well out of it.

The tensions in the federation of Muslims and Croats are something else: They could start fighting again about the division of territory.

Then the Dayton agreement and peace would be endangered again. But I understand the Croats: The Muslims have such high birth figures that they exceed the Croats by four. On the other hand the Croats have got more territory than they deserve. That inevitably creates tensions.

[Verheyden] If there is a conflict, which side will you choose?

[Karadzic] None, we are not UN soldiers. I hope that it will never come to a conflict. But then I would instinctively choose the weakest, those who are attacked. That is just the way I am.

[Verheyden] Do you believe that the former Yugoslav republics will ever be able to work together again?

[Karadzic] That is inevitable, for ourselves and Europe. But then on a fair basis. If cooperation means that we are once again dominated by the Muslims, then my people will not accept that.

It would be logical that—as a first step—we form a sort of federation with our fellow people in Serbia-Montenegro. But the world does not want to allow us to do that.

[Verheyden] In contrast with Presidents Franjo Tudjman, Slobodan Milosevic, and Alija Izetbegovic, you are not a candidate for the Nobel peace prize.

[Karadzic] Izetbegovic is entirely responsible for the war. He should not get a Nobel prize, but an indictment for crimes against peace. For some people *I* am a war criminal, for others I am a hero. For the Serbs, the Greeks, even in Japan and China, I am a hero.

[Verheyden] How do you assess the actions of UN representative Bildt?

[Karadzic] Bildt makes the most incredible remarks, especially about me. We do not want to turn our people

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against him, because he must fulfill his mission in the name of peace. But I did not expect him to attack me personally, after all he is a guest in my country.

[Verheyden] Imagine that you are not elected. What then?

[Karadzic] Then I will write books: poems, works on psychiatry. I am too old, otherwise I would start a private hospital with my wife. I miss my practice, I was a dynamic and good therapist.

I want to treat patients again. And I also want to write a number of children's books.

B-H: DSS Chairman Backs Karadzic as Legitimate President

LD2205221596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1650 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 22 May (SRNA)—Vojislav Kostunica, chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], said today that Dr. Radovan Karadzic is the legitimate president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic. The DSS chairman said the whole campaign against the president of the Serb Republic was designed to influence and determine the outcome of the elections before they had begun. [passage omitted]

"There are great difficulties in implementing the Dayton agreement, which is a contradiction in itself, because it came up with a formula whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina was both a unitary and a confederal state," Kostunica concluded.

B-H: Plavsic Prepared To 'Stand' in Presidential Elections

AU2305125096 Paris AFP in English 1243 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 23 (AFP)—Biljana Plavsic, vice-president of the Bosnian Serb entity, said Thursday [23 May] that she would stand in the presidential elections in Republika Srpska if asked by her party.

"If my party asks me, I would submit my candidacy," said Plavsic in an interview with the Belgrade weekly NIN.

Plavsic was appointed by Serb leader Radovan Karadzic last week to deal with the international community.

She said that Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party [SDS] planned to hold a meeting soon and a decision would be made at that time as to who would stand in the elections set to take place throughout Bosnia in September.

Plavsic, considered a hardliner, was promoted to her post by Karadzic last week following attempts by the international community to unseat him.

She told NIN that it was unlikely Karadzic would ever be handed over to the UN tribunal that has indicted him on war crimes charges.

"I cannot imagine any Serb doing such a thing, not only against Karadzic but against anyone who took part in our struggle," she was quoted as saying.

B-H: Banja Luka Mayor Explains Talks With U.S. Delegation

LD2205170296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1432 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 22 May (SRNA)—In my talks with U.S. officials today, I only discussed issues within my competence, Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic said today.

He explained that his talks with U.S. Ambassador John Menzies, William Montgomery, the coordinator for the peace process in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a delegation of the U.S. Agency for International Development, focused on preparations for the upcoming elections, particularly in Banja Luka.

"I told the U.S. delegation that 35,000 refugees have indeed left Banja Luka, but, at the same time, 85,000 refugees have come to Banja Luka; the problem of repatriation, which is much talked about in Europe, therefore also exists here.

"It is necessary that the Serbs return to the Republic of Serb Krajina and western Slavonia, which were occupied by Croatia; Serb refugees are coming from eastern Slavonia to Banja Luka in increasing numbers," Radic said.

According to Radic, the repatriation issue must be tackled in a "more comprehensive way", i.e., Croatia and the Muslim-Croat Federation must also fulfill their obligations for refugees to return to their homes.

B-H: Return of 152 Serbs to Grbavica 'Encouraging'

AU2205180296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The return of 152 ethnic Serbs [words indistinct] in their apartments and homes [word indistinct] reintegration of the Grbavica area is a positive and encouraging piece of information which assists the efforts that all people return to their homes, Mirko Pejanovic, member of the state presidency and president of the Serbian Civic Council said, among other things,

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at a meeting in Novo Sarajevo municipality today. The meeting was also attended by the representatives of the ethnic Serb citizens.

Pejanovic said that [words indistinct], citing as an example [words indistinct] in the offices of authority, [passage indistinct]. He emphasized that the personal and the property security of all citizens, regardless of [words indistinct]. The ethnic Serb citizens [words indistinct] in the normalization of life [passage indistinct].

The meeting upheld a proposal to form the committee for [passage indistinct].

B-H: Bosnian Serbs Seek Information on 108 POW's

LD2205221396 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The list of the Herzegovina Corps commission for the exchange of POW's still contains the names of 108 soldiers missing in the recent war. Out of this number, 19 were members of the former Yugoslav People's Army from Montenegro and Serbia and 89 were members of the army of the Serb Republic. Most of them were missing in the spring and summer of 1992, largely in the Neretva valley and on the Dubrovnik-Trebinje section of the Herzegovina front.

Hopes that any of them will be found alive are waning, despite the fact that the Herzegovina Corps commission has consistently been asking the Croat and Muslim sides to provide more information about the fate of these people. Last week, the families and forensic expert Dr. Zoran Stankovic of the Medical Military Academy of Belgrade identified the bodies of eight members of the Herzegovina Corps from Trebinje, Bileca, and Nevesinje, who were handed over by the Croat side five days ago.

B-H: Police Say 7 Captured Muslims Treated Correctly by Serbs

LD2205191296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1542 GMT 22 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bijeljina, May 22 (TANJUG)—Spokesman for the International Police Force (IPTF) in the Muslim town of Tuzla in northeastern Bosnia Angeli Andren said Wednesday that the group of seven Muslims captured around Zvornik recently and accused of terrorism were treated correctly.

The group, currently under criminal investigation in Bijeljina, have the right to medical check-up, clean clothes and may take showers and talk to IPTF staff, Andren told a press conference in Bijeljina in the northeast of the Bosnian Serb entity, the Republika Srpska.

IPTF commander in Bijeljina Adrian Tierney voiced satisfaction over cooperation between the international police and the Serb police and local residents.

Tierney said the group was allowed to talk to international police without the presence of Serb officials or police.

B-H: PM Muratovic Receives U.S. Trade Envoy, Delegation

AU2205184096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic received U.S. Assistant Trade Secretary Raymond [word indistinct] and his aides in Sarajevo today. They discussed preparations for the arrival of a U.S. business delegation to continue the mission started by U.S. Secretary of Trade Ron Brown before his death in a plane crash near Dubrovnik.

The U.S. envoy was particularly interested in the ideas and [word indistinct] of the republican government. Prime Minister Muratovic informed the guest about the concrete possibilities and requirements in individual departments, and stressed that (?the main objective) should be the creation of conditions for commercial arrangements, and U.S. companies' investments and joint venture projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They pointed to the need for technical assistance in the preparation of legal regulations and [word indistinct] of the organization [words indistinct] trade.

The prime minister stressed that [words indistinct] the reconstruction projects, financed by the World Bank, there was sufficient scope for commercial arrangements, and demanded that ways be examined to engage U.S. companies more in mining in particular.

B-H: Presidency Member Says Dayton Accord 'Greatest Failure'

LD2205192196 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivo Komsic, a member of the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina] presidency, told Travnik Radio today that the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is extremely uncertain, primarily because of the desire of most of its Serbs and Croats to live in separate states firmly linked with their mother countries.

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The Serb Republic is now a state entity of the Serb people and it has been separating from Bosnia-Herzegovina in a systematic way. The Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna is moving almost in the same direction, Komsic said.

According to Komsic, if setting up their own states is a real aspiration of the Serb and the Croat people, they should not be prevented from realizing this goal.

The Dayton agreement is our greatest failure because Bosnia-Herzegovina was practically lost and divided between Belgrade and Zagreb, although many are unsuccessfully trying to prove otherwise, Komsic said in conclusion.

B-H: Federation Interior Minister Views Police Forces

AU2305104796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 96 p 6

[Interview with Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Zoran Milanovic in Zagreb; date not given: "I Cannot Console Myself for Having To Let Milan Martic Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Milanovic] Mr. Hebib, how are the Dayton agreements being implemented regarding the organization of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Hebib] I must admit I am not completely satisfied with the relationship between the Croatian and Bosniak police forces within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We still have certain incidents, particularly regarding some points, which fortunately we have managed to solve very successfully. Among other things, our visit to Zagreb serves to improve these relations, the reintegration of the police, and the reorganization of the police forces in the Federation. So, we are here to solve certain things, and I am convinced that we will succeed together.

[Milanovic] What are those problems?

[Hebib] In fact, I would not call them problems. They are more like polemical tones, let us say, regarding the number of police officers that should make up the Federation MUP. We have agreed that their number should not be less than 15,000. Because, you must know that the police is the only force that will be the guarantee of security for all the citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, the Dayton agreements, as well as the international community, have placed a big and serious task before us—the return of all the refugees and displaced persons to their homes. One must provide 100 percent security for those people. When I think of it, I am afraid that this figure of 15,000 could be insufficient for the successful execution of this very important mission.

[Milanovic] The first public reactions that indicated some unsolved problems in relations between the Croatian and Bosniak police forces occurred on the occasion of the recent reintegration of the occupied parts of Sarajevo into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What was the reason for the incidents?

[Hebib] I think that the process of the reintegration of the Sarajevo municipalities went very well. The reintegration plan had been worked out in detail with the representatives of the international community. Everything functioned perfectly until the moment of our entry into Hadzici.

National Structure of the Police

[Milanovic] That act was preceded by certain criticism on your account about the insufficient number of Croats in the federal police. The tensions culminated when a group of Croatian policemen from Herzeg-Bosnia appeared in Hadzici?

[Hebib] A completely unnecessary incident occurred then. I wonder who needed it. Who needed a political incident, when the whole plan was precisely agreed upon earlier.

[Milanovic] What precisely was agreed?

[Hebib] It was agreed that in the integrated territories, in the police forces of the Sarajevo region, there will be a percentage of policemen of Croatian and Serbian nationality proportionate to the last, the 1991 census. However, since we have had a sufficient number of Croats and Serbs in the Sarajevo police, we did not pay attention to that term of reference. Thus in Vogosca, where there should have been two Croats, according to the ethnic structure, we sent 8, in Ilijas 11, although 5 would have sufficed. So, we did not entirely respect the ethnic structure, and there was no place for any disagreements and speculation.

[Milanovic] However, this incident repeated itself in Ilidza?

[Hebib] Such an incident occurred at the moment when a number of policemen of Croatian nationality from Kiseljak, in blue uniforms, tried to enter Ilidza. Let me remind you, two days earlier, a serious incident had occurred in Kiseljak. Several cab drivers from Sarajevo had been assaulted, and their vehicles demolished. When the cab drivers heard that the policemen from Kiseljak in blue uniforms were to come to Ilidza, they seriously warned us that they would provoke an incident. Bearing that in mind, we did not want to place

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anyone in a situation in which he would be attacked. Although there was pressure put on me, I did not give up, because of the safety of those policemen who would come in blue uniforms. Many were not satisfied with that stand of mine, but despite that I was resolute.

[Milanovic] Some international institutions have also been dissatisfied with your stand.

[Hebib] There were pressures also from the international community. They were telling me to send at least three policemen of Croatian nationality, and I answered them that I would send as many as 30 of them, but not in uniforms that would set them apart in the masses and cause unwanted incidents. I even invited some foreign officers who insisted upon that, and told them: "Gentlemen, bring your sons, but do not push other people's sons into trouble, because such an irresponsible stand has taken my son's life and I do not want anything similar to happen to anybody else."

Abduction of Journalists

[Milanovic] The Croatian public has recently been upset by the report that two HRT [Croatian Radio Television] journalists were abducted in Doglodi near Sarajevo. Is it true that only on your personal insistence were those two journalists released?

I must say that I am the only minister in the federal government elected by the representatives of the Assembly. It is a very large obligation toward all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their national affiliation. I have fought, and I will fight for the rights of all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as for the protection of their human freedoms. When I was informed that journalists had been obstructed in their attempts to talk to people, I immediately intervened to let them go. Because, if we want to go into a system of democratic relations, then we must tell the public both the good and the bad news. The prevention of truth coming to the public is not the way to democracy, and therefore I intervened. I said that journalists should not be prevented from talking to people. So, I have done nothing special, I was just doing my job.

[Milanovic] Although you have done a lot in a very short period as minister of the Federation MUP, which has been recognized by many international observers, in a part of the Sarajevo press (DNEVNI AVAZ and LJILJAN) you have been attacked for the alleged return of the communists and "Delimustafic's men" to the police. Are such attacks justified?

[Hebib] It is true that recently some articles have been published in which one wants to create some kind of problematic situation. That is groundless. I do not make such quick decisions on the removal of personnel. I want to get the maximum out of every man. So, I have no surplus personnel, because no professional working in the service is surplus for me.

AID Is No Secret Organization

[Milanovic] There was also a lot of discussion and harsh criticism on account of the establishment of the Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID), which was compared by many in the Croatian media to the former UDBA [former Yugoslav State Security Service]. Is there any parallel between the MUP and the Agency and what are your relations with them?

[Hebib] This question has often been asked in public. Anyone who understands the work should know that every state has its state security. Even in former Yugoslavia the issue of the organization of the State Security was raised. There were suggestions that it should be organized as a special service that would be completely independent and would not be responsible to the state leadership. It has proved to be functional with us to organize it independently, in order to strengthen both the public and the state security. I do not know why AID is such a big thorn in the side when it is a service that every country must have. The functional association of state and public security is an inseparable mechanism. General policy must be united and there should be no disagreement. So, it is neither a secret organization, nor is it specially organized.

[Milanovic] Then, can you tell us why the United States has had such harsh objections on the Agency that the first director of AID, Bakir Alispahic, was removed from office? There were also objections that the Agency consisted of former KOS [Yugoslav Army Counter Intelligence Service] members and members of UDBA.

[Hebib] This is a very delicate question and I would prefer not to answer it. Because I really do not know what the Americans wanted, and if they applied that pressure for the removal and why. I only know that some quality changes occurred with the arrival of the new director, Kemal Ademovic, a glorious fighter for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a fact that a certain number of people who used to work in the intelligence service of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] worked in the Agency. Since I personally know those people, I will tell you that they left the JNA in time and placed themselves in the service of their own nation. Therefore, it is not fair to make accusations against these people for having being KOS and UDBA members.

[Milanovic] What is your relationship with Mr. Jozo Leutar, deputy minister of the MUP of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

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[Hebib] Mr. Jozo Leutar, my deputy, and I have known each other for more than 20 years. Our relations are very good, and they are at the highest professional level. We have not yet met with an occasion on which we have disagreed, and that can be a guarantee that we will overcome all the problems in the Federal MUP.

Milan Martic's Arrest

[Milanovic] Mr. Hebib, you are one of the rare people in such a high position who has lost his son in this war, and your nearest and more distant relatives have passed through the Golgotha of war and various forms of harassment. How did you manage to get over that deep personal tragedy?

[Hebib] This is a really difficult question for me. Unfortunately, I have not lost only my son. Six brothers and sons from the Hebib family have died in this war. Not to mention the Golgotha of my more distant relatives who have suffered in this war only because their family name is Hebib. In this sadness, the only thing that makes me strong is the hope that the future young generations will live in a happier Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Milanovic] And, finally, a question that will most certainly be of interest to the Croatian public: Are you the first, and unfortunately the only, man who has arrested war criminal Milan Martic once?

[Hebib] It is true that in cooperation with the citizens of Bosanska Otoka, on the eve of the war, I arrested Milan Martic, who wanted to provoke a situation that would give grounds for an aggression against the Bosanska Krajina. I tried to take Martic into custody in Bihac prison, but at that moment it was really impossible, because when I arrived in [Bosanska] Otoka by helicopter, I saw that the whole region had been occupied by the former JNA. Everything was prepared for an offensive. And I am sure that had Martic been eliminated then, or imprisoned, a disaster would have occurred, because they had prepared a bloody attack on that region and its unarmed inhabitants. Thus, we had to let Martic go, and I personally cannot console myself for that.

B-H: Gen Delic Addresses Air Force Anniversary Celebration

AU2205172396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 May 96

[Address by General Rasim Delic, chief of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the celebration of the Air Force anniversary in Zenica—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have a bitter experience, gained over the past 100 years, as to what forgetfulness means, which has always brought with itself a new and even more terrible genocide waged by the great Serbian policy against the Bosniak people. Therefore, reconciliation must not eradicate the truth about the aggression and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let the present and future generations of Bosniaks learn and know about it, as well as all the people who consider Bosnia-Herzegovina to be their homeland. Knowing the truth, they will also know how to prevent any aggressor who would undertake a similar adventure. Therefore, the path that the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in general, will follow in the future is a path of technological, military, and expert strengthening of the peacetime professional echelon, which will be the factor of defense and security. However, it also entails building the capacity of every patriotic citizen, which will enable him to take part, with arms in hand or in some other appropriate way, in the all-out national resistance, as was the case in this war.

B-H: 'Senior Defence Sources': IFOR To Remain in Bosnia

MS2305092796 London INDEPENDENT in English 23 May 96 p 13

[Report by Christopher Bellamy: "West Will Keep Force in Bosnia Next Year"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A significant peace-keeping force is expected to remain in Bosnia after the withdrawal of the peace-implementation force (I-For), according to senior defence sources.

The size and composition of the "post-I-For" force is as uncertain as its function, but it is expected to include US, British and French troops. That may mean a continued Nato presence. Expectations of a post-IFor force have been played down until now. But it appears that without a continued Western presence everything achieved so far will collapse, and that Britain and the US will stay in Bosnia in some form.

Until now, the US had insisted its troops would leave Bosnia after the year-long I-For mission. Britain was committed to sticking with the Americans under the "one-out, all-out" policy. The US recently said it would delay withdrawal and now appears to have accepted the need for a residual force.

Although I-For's mission has gone well, the sources said they were worried there was no sign of reconciliation between the former warring parties. After almost four years of war, that is not surprising, but they said it made a continued military presence advisable.

When I-For arrived in Bosnia in December, it planned to stay for no more than a year. That would have

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meant the 60,000-strong force would start withdrawing in September, a bad time, as it would coincide with Bosnia's elections. It is now accepted the withdrawal will not begin until December.

Sources yesterday would not speculate on the size of the follow-on force, although troops in Bosnia believe a force of about 20,000—one-third of the present force—could hold the "Zone of Separation" between Serbs and the Muslim-Croat federation.

The presence of foreign troops in Bosnia could become an election issue. Hard-liners, particularly in the Bosnian Serb zone, could use the foreign presence as a vote-winner.

The next milestone in Bosnia is the review conference in Florence on 13-14 June, which will report that I-For's mission has been remarkably successful. In July the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has to certify that conditions are satisfactory for the elections. These have to take place by 14 September and will be supervised by the OSCE with security provided by I-For.

Maintenance of the peace in Bosnia is seen as dependent on reconstruction. Now that the demanding tasks of securing the 4 km-wide "Zone of Separation" is complete, I-For troops are devoting much of their effort to reconstruction.

The sources ruled out any early action to arrest the indicted war criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, saying that the consequences if it went wrong, or even it it went right, might be to upset the fragile peace. However, diplomatic sources yesterday said there were "definite signs" that Dr Karadzic might give up the leadership in the next day or so.

The Nato Secretary General, Javier Solana, said the redeployment of I-For troops would make it more difficult for suspected war criminals to move around.

Under the Dayton peace accord, I-For troops are to apprehend any suspected war criminals they come across, but are not required to seek them out. The defence sources indicated that policy would not change.

B-H: Mostar Elections Delayed; Refugees Permitted To Vote

AU2305110696 Paris AFP in English
1059 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—Bosnia's first post-war elections, which were to take place in the southern city of Mostar on May 31, have been postponed to "some time in June," the office of the top civilian official in Bosnia said Thursday.

The elections will take place "some time in June," Colum Murphy, spokesman for top civilian official Carl Bildt said in Sarajevo.

Moslem political parties had threatened to boycott the polls if they went ahead in May under rules, set by the European Union, that did not allow refugees from fighting in the city to vote.

But the Moslem and Croat parties came to an agreement Wednesday after negotiations led by Bildt's deputy Michael Steiner, Murphy said.

Steiner, speaking to reporters outside his office in Sarajevo, said he wanted to assure former residents of the city registered in the 1991 census and who left the city when fighting flared in 1993 and 1994 that they "are going to be able to participate in the vote."

B-H: Mostar Croats Deny Agreeing To Delay Elections

AU2305114996 Paris AFP in English
1124 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 23 (AFP)—A Croat official in Mostar said Thursday that there was no agreement yet on whether municipal elections due to take place on May 31 should be postponed.

Mile Puljic, an official in the mayor's office in the Croat-held west Mostar, told AFP by telephone that Croat officials had been contacted by Michael Steiner, assistant to High Representative Carl Bildt.

"We have received a proposal from the office of Michael Steiner that the elections be delayed," Puljic said.

"No agreement has yet been reached," he said.

B-H: EU Official Refuses To Confirm Mostar Election Delay

AU2305155996 Paris AFP in English
1550 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 23 (AFP)—A European Union official in the southern town of Mostar would not confirm Thursday afternoon an announcement that elections in the town had been delayed.

A spokesman for Bosnia's top civilian official Carl Bildt had told reporters in Sarajevo earlier that the municipal elections, scheduled for May 31, would take place "some time in June."

"It's the responsibility of the EU administrator, Ricardo Perez Casado, to take decisions about Mostar and make them public once they have been taken," EU spokesman Howard Fox told AFP.

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The European Union is responsible for organising the elections in Mostar and is not subordinate to Bildt, the High Representative who is responsible for implementing the civilian aspects of the Dayton peace agreement which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina last year.

Perez Casado was in Zagreb Thursday discussing the Mostar elections with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman after talks in Sarajevo Wednesday with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

A European official told AFP Wednesday that Perez Casado would announce the results of the meetings in Mostar on Friday.

B-H: UNHCR Bus Opens Mostar-Nevesinje Bus Route

AU2205180696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a two-day delay, a UNHCR bus bound for Nevesinje departed from the Mostar bus station this morning. This is an unequaled advance toward a regular bus link between these two towns.

[Words indistinct] restoration of this line was assumed by the UNHCR. This is one of the basic preconditions for the realization of the freedom of movement on the territory [words indistinct]. As we were told by the UNHCR representative, the Mostar residents who today [words indistinct] east Herzegovina. Directly prior to the departure [words indistinct] passengers. Despite this incident, the bus [words indistinct] while UNHCR representatives [words indistinct].

B-H: EU Signs Deals on Water, Agricultural Aid

AU2205162696 Paris AFP in English 1600 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 22 (AFP)—The European Commission on Wednesday signed two memorandums of understanding (MOU) with the Bosnian government for 18 million dollars worth of aid to Bosnia, the commission said in a statement here.

Donato Chiarini, European Commission special envoy to Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed one MOU with Ahmed Smajic, minister of agriculture and water management, for the supply of 10 million dollars of equipment and materials in the water supply sector.

The main objective of the programme is to improve the delivery of basic water services to the population in 58 municipalities, the commission said.

The other MOU concerned the supply of 7.3 million dollars of farm mechanisation equipment to private farmers, the commission added.

The aid is part of a wider programme of European Union assistance to help Bosnia-Herzegovina recover from its three-and-a-half-year war.

B-H: Impact of 'Gray Economy' Seen as Increasing

LD2205225996 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 22 May (BH PRESS)—Sulejman Hrle, chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina trade unions, and Hasan Zolic, director of the Statistics Institute, held a news conference in Sarajevo today in connection with the latest statistics confirming the low standard of living of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, the high cost of goods in the consumer shopping basket, and an increase in nonproductive employment—the gray economy, etc.

Although the general view of the director of the statistics institute is that the facts—despite the objective circumstances—indicate a slight tendency toward a rise in industrial production and the standard of living, trade union representatives believe that the presented facts are the most serious indicator to the government that it must do something urgently. [passage omitted]

They also say that more workers are moonlighting, which makes the position of legally employed workers, the unemployed, and retirees, all the more difficult. Citizens would need to work almost two months to afford the basic 20-item consumer shopping basket, and they could not even dream about a 40-item basket, which is normal in peacetime.

The trade union has filed a request with the government to urgently approve heavy penalties to prevent the growth of the gray economy. [passage omitted]

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Croatia: Granic, U.S.'s Kornblum Issue Statement on Talks

LD2205193596 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Talks between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Croatian officials and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum have just concluded. Here is what Mate Granic and John Kornblum said after the talks:

[Begin Granic recording] Dear ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Kornblum had very comprehensive talks with President Tudjman, particularly on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the implementation of the peace agreement, the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, and on overall Croatian-U.S. relations.

With regard to eastern Slavonia, both sides concluded that the process is proceeding well; we believe it will be successful.

With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are problems in the Serb Republic, particularly in connection with the currently unclear situation with Karadzic. This was also discussed, and Mr. Kornblum informed us about all the moves the U.S. Government is taking to clarify the situation.

As far as the Federation is concerned, we are investing joint efforts in its consolidation. The latest of such efforts were seen in Washington, at the so-called forum for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which produced very specific results.

We also discussed the elections in Mostar and we believe that a solution will be found to enable the elections to be held on time. This would most certainly strengthen the overall peace process, especially in the Federation.

As far as Croatian-U.S. relations are concerned, they are following an upward trend. There are contacts at all levels. We are expecting a U.S. business delegation, led by Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor. An important U.S. delegation is also visiting Croatia at present.

The overall conclusion is that relations between the two countries are developing well and following an upward trend. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: Susak, Ukrainian Defense Minister Sign Memorandum

LD2205145896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A high-level Ukrainian military delegation headed by Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov met in Zagreb today with Croatian defense Minister Gojko Susak. The delegation was also received by Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa. We have a report from Anabela Lajkauh:

[Lajkauh] After the meeting in the Defense Ministry, Ministers Shmarov and Susak signed a memorandum on military cooperation between Ukraine and Croatia. A cooperation treaty will be signed in Kiev. Minister Susak said that cooperation will cover all areas permitted under international conventions. The Croatian minister thanked the Ukra' ian soldiers who have been in Croatia as part of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], the Impementation Force [IFOR], and the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES].

Ukraine's defense minister said that the talks covered the situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and security in Europe in connection with NATO expansion.

The Ukrainian delegation and Minister Shmarov were also received by Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa. Following the talks, Minister Shmarov said that good prospects exist for the two countries to cooperate in all fields. He said he is pleased with Prime Minister Matesa's assurances about the safety of Ukrainian soldiers in Croatia.

In this context, the two sides also discussed the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Danubia, the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the general political situation in Croatia.

Croatia: Granic Says Croatia's Role in Bosnia Constructive

LD2205183996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 May 96

[Report by correspondent Andjelko Perincic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, this afternoon received Michael Steiner, deputy high representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement. Following their one-hour long talks, they made brief statements. Mr. Steiner spoke first.

[Steiner in English fading into Serbo-Croatian report by Perincic] We had an extremely good talk about the implementation of the peace agreements and about the situation in the Croat-Muslim Federation. You know that it is in our common interest to complete the Federation as fast as possible. We also discussed the very topical issue of local elections in Mostar. We both want to help in solving this problem. I am very encouraged by today's talks, Steiner said.

Minister Granic said that the talks were meaningful and constructive, and are part of a series of meetings

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about the Federation which began in Dayton, and which includes the recent meeting in Washington. Croatia plays a constructive role in the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said.

[Begin Granic recording] Of course we talked about the elections in Mostar, where the Croatian side supports all the provisions of the agreements, all the previous agreements, and the agreements reached in Zagreb. It would of course be most useful if a solution could found so that the elections could be held as soon as possible. If these elections are postponed, then it is likely that the fall elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will also be threatened. Any delay will also threaten the Dayton Agreement. [end recording]

[Perincic] This is the main reason why Croatia wants to continue to play a constructive role, Granic said.

Croatia: Council of Europe Decision Criticized

AU2305110596 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 96 p 1

[Commentary by Nenad Ivankovic: "Who Has Put Croatia on Ice and Why?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What is the main reason for postponing Croatia's admission to the Council of Europe? Is it really Croatia's media and democratic deficits (both those fabricated and those exaggerated), as one section of the international and domestic public wants to suggest? Reducing it, for instance, to a statement like this: "To blame for the humiliation of Croatia is not the supposedly hostile Council of Europe, but actually the current Croatian authorities. As the whole world knows, the recommendation to admit Croatia into the Council of Europe was rejected exclusively because of the behavior of the Croatian authorities" (Krsto Cviic in SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, 19 May 1996).

The president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Germany's Leni Fischer, however, sees the whole situation essentially differently. As reported in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [FAZ] on Saturday [18 May], Mrs. Fischer said that in Strasbourg everybody had been very surprised that the EU foreign ministers (after their meeting in Brussels last Monday and Tuesday) had sent "instructions" that Croatia should be left outside the door of this oldest European institution for a time. That is as much as "novuum" [as published] because it was the EU in January this year, when Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe, that did the diametric opposite. It put pressure on the representatives in Strasbourg to admit Russia, despite all the bloodshed in Chechenya and numerous shortfalls regarding legal order and human rights. Moreover, Mrs. Fischer told the Frankfurt newspaper that for some time she had had "a bad feeling" about the [non]admission of Croatia to the Council of Europe.

Does this not show that some things in Croatia have been deliberately blown out of proportion in order to find an excuse to leave Zagreb outside the door because it is allegedly not democratic enough?

Mrs. Fischer, who FAZ says was apparently "irritated" by the decision of the EU foreign ministers, asks: What is supposed to be achieved by putting Croatia on ice? Particularly when in Russia's case the perspective was completely different. Then, it was being said that Moscow should be admitted because that was the only thing that could increase Yeltsin's chances of winning the presidential elections again, as well as that admission, and not isolation, could strengthen the rule of law and human rights in that vast country. In Croatia's case, that recipe was discarded and now they are advocating something completely different. In that context, Mrs. Fischer (who is not alone in her indignation; other representatives in Strasbourg have seriously criticized the decision of the EU ministers, having literally called it "hypocritical") also reminds us of this. On the occasion of Moscow's admission to the Council of Europe, Russia's political and state leadership committed itself to imposing a moratorium on executions. Now that Russia has become a member of the Council of Europe, there is nothing of this! Indeed, over the last few days executions in Russia have been carried out on a grand scale and none of the EU members, who are so concerned over democracy in Croatia, has either reacted or criticized Yeltsin for it.

If one can judge by the indiscretions that surfaced after the "hypocritical" decision of the 15, then there are utterly pragmati interests and motives. FAZ emphasizes that the first to oppose the admission of Croatia to the Council of Europe were some NATO members (the United States was mentioned specifically!!!) because they wanted "indirectly" to force Croatia to make some new concessions in Bosnia. Then the EU ministers accepted the idea and put it into practice. Therefore, pessimists do not think it impossible that Croatia will remain outside the door of the Council of Europe for as long as "another year after IFOR's [Implementation Force] withdrawal from Bosnia." Only then would it be Croatia's turn and, it is stated, it would be together with the "FRY" and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Regardless of how much truth there is in these gloomy forecasts, one thing seems certain. Croatia has not been refused admission to the Council of Europe because of the allegedly dramatic state of its democracy. It is more likely that things have been deliberately dramatized (doubtlessly with the assistance of one section of

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domestic circles) for the sake of foreign interests. The games in Mostar, as well as others, give us a hint as to what this is all about and why it is intended to put pressure on and possibly weaken Zagreb.

Croatia: UN Project To Return Serbs, Croats to Slavonia Noted

LD2205191696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1551 GMT 22 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 22 (TANJUG)—The United Nations Transitional Administration for East Slavonia (UNTAES) and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are preparing a pilot project of the return of Serbs and Croats to four villages in Slavonia.

The UNHCR Belgrade office said in an announcement on Wedensday these were the villages of Antunovac and Ernestinovo (east Slavonia), Bilje (Baranja) and Kusonje (west Slavonia).

The region of east Slavonia, Baranja and west Srem is a territory between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was placed—by an agreement signed by representatives of the Croatian authorities and local Serbs—under the one-year transitional administration of the United Nations which may be extended for another one-year mandate.

The first step in preparing the refugee return project will be made by UNTAES which will engage its teams to clear mines in the village areas of Antunovac, Ernestinovo, Bilje and Kusonje.

Then the UNHCR, in cooperation with international organizations and donors, will begun repair work on private houses, public buildings and will reconstruct infrastructure in the villages to furnish the minimum conditions for refugees to return to their homes, the UNHCR announcement said.

UNTAES civilian affairs chief Gerard Fischer said on Tuesday that pilot programs now being made should hold equally for Serbs, Croats, and Hungarians.

Croatia: Hadzic's Appointment in Slavonia Criticized

96BA0278A Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 p 4

[Editorial: "Goran Hadzic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Election of the assistant warehouse clerk Goran Hadzic to the office of so-called president of the so-called Serbian Oblast of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem is the final act in Slobodan Milosevic's unscrupulous playing with the ethnic, political, and moral dignity of the Serbian people and just another shameful marketing of used fog to those who are still naive.

The formation of some kind of Serbian "government" with a pack of "ministers" on Croatian territory (even covered by "special broadcasts" over the regime's media in Belgrade) is an additional "act" in this most recent three-ring circus.

Following the peace accords signed in Dayton and in Paris, Croatia has been definitively constituted as a state within the borders it had in the former Yugoslavia, which means that on its sovereign and internationally recognized and guarded space there are no "entities," "cantons," or "autonomous regions" whatsoever in an institutional form.

The work of the "Assembly," the "government," the "president," the "prime minister," and "ministers" of the so-called Serbian Oblast of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem is strictly limited by that reality; they will perform the final transfer of Beli Manastir, Vukovar, Dalj, Mirkovci, and Tenja Opstinas to the state of Croatia and will perform a number of "dirty tasks" so that that takes place as peacefully as possible, and then, both as "politicians" and as people, they will be swallowed up by the bloody mud of one of the greatest historical mistakes and expensive adventures of the Serbian people.

Some of them, thanks to the war for "all the Serbs," will be financially taken care of to the end of their lives as emigres; some of them, depending on their own moral culpability, will "get along" fine even in Croatia; some will return to various secret positions in Serbia; and some will probably never really know what happened to them and what it was in which they were involved.

In this entire story "with a sad ending" (for beginning it, weaving it, and the way it wound up, Slobodan Milosevic and his perpetual right hand Vojislav Seselj, if there is anything human left in them, ought to withdraw into rat holes), the "career" of the assistant warehouse clerk Goran Hadzic is most fascinating, because he is the paradigm both of this war now ended and the ethnic "transport" and then nightmare, both of the idea of a Great Serbia and also of the passing political and moral profile of the "remnant of a slaughtered people," that is, of its elites.

This utter marginalist, whose skin is thicker than shoe leather, was one of the main "players on the field" in all phases of the Serbian madness and suffering, from the period of "defense of home and hearth," through the period of creation and consolidation of the so-called

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Serbian Republic Krajina [RSK], which was doomed in advance to failure, to this last inevitable period of totaling up and paying the bill for the bloody binge.

He went off to the war for "all the Serbs," just like his chief Slobodan Milosevic, with his fur hat and cockade, and he returned from it, following his chief Slobodan Milosevic, with a "titovka" and red star.

The truth, of course, is that both of them, along with all those who followed and are still following them, lined up under the cockade exclusively out of ambition and avarice, not out of conviction, and the truth is that they are under the red star today mainly for the same reasons and in the same frame of mind.

This is simply a strain of moral monsters and pests such as exist in all times and in all peoples, but the tragedy is that in this period of Serbian history those moral monsters and pests are the measure of the national fighter, politician, and statesman.

Their breeding grounds, to be sure, are the bunkers of evil of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], SRS [Serbian Radical Party], JUL [United Yugoslav Left], SANU [Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], BU [expansion not given], and parts of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and they were ordered so that they did not fade by the state and quasi-state media, and here is the essence of the problem.

Because of a great deal of rot in the breeding grounds (favorable for the young plants) and because of a great deal of dirty water from the waterers (necessary for rapid sprouting), their duplicates are unfortunately all around us.

What is interesting and by no means incidental in the story about the paradigmatic ignominy of the assistant warehouse clerk Goran Hadzic, who with knowledge mainly gained from crossword puzzles (ak, Ararat, Sar, Rur, Ana, ara) has even been wandering the halls of the United Nations in the name of Serbian interests, is that his last election to the office of so-called president of the so-called Serbian Oblast of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, that is, to a mandate which consists of rounding out the capitulation of "all Serbian lands," was assured by the Radicals, who in the phantom "Assembly" of that "oblast" constitute a majority.

In the unscrupulous game played with the people, Slobodan Milosevic, but also his faithful Vojislav Seselj, really goes to the end every time.

Croatia: Tudjman Insists Mostar Elections Comply With Dayton

LD2305113296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia President Franjo Tudjman has received European Un. on [EU] Mostar administrator Ricard Perez Casado. During the talks, President Tudjman said that Croatia is interested in the success of the EU and Mr. Casado's mission and that Mr. Casado can count on Croatian help.

President Tudjman also stressed that Croatia is determined to see the Washington and Dayton agreements consistently implemented, particularly in connection with strengthening the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this connection, it is important that the Mostar elections take place in accordance with the agreements; if this is not done, everything that was achieved in Dayton might be threatened, President Tudjman said.

The talks covered possible compromise solutions, in connection with which intensive diplomatic activity is being conducted in order to ensure that Mostar elections are held by the second half of June, when the EU mandate expires. The talks were also attended by Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic; Zeljko Matic, the president's foreign policy adviser; and Ciro Grubisic, Croatian consul in Mostar.

[Madrid RNE International in Spanish at 1000 GMT on 23 May reported: "Ricard Perez Casado, the Spaniard who is EU administrator in Mostar, is considering the possibility of postponing the municipal elections called for 31 May. Perez Casado, who yesterday met with Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim president of Bosnia, today travels to Zagreb to examine with Croatian authorities the possibility of a postponement, as requested by the Muslim community of Mostar."]

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FYROM: British Ambassador Explains Visa Difficulties

AU2205153096 Skopje MIC in English 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The ambassador of the United Kingdom to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Repubic of Macedonia—FYROM] Tony Milson is pessimistic that in any foreseeable time, Macedonian citizens will be able to receive visas for travelling to this country in the British embassy in Skopje. According to Ambassador Milson, this question is connected with a number of problems. For the time being, the embassy in Skopje can provide citizens interested in travelling to the United Kingdom with application forms, or to check whether they are filled in properly, which will make sure that when they travel to Belgrade or Sofia, these citizens are really issued a visa.

The opening of a separate visa service in Skopje requires an enlargement of the present personnel, the provision of additional offices and new financial means.

FYROM: Serb Leader Criticizes Remarks by Gligorov

LD2205211696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1522 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 22 May (SRNA)—Dragisa Miletic, president of the Democratic Party of Serbs [DPS] in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today said that statements by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov for the benefit of Croatia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were inappropriate and tendentious.

At a news conference in Skopje, he said that immediately after the mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and FYROM, Gligorov congratulated Franjo Tudjman on "victory over the occupying forces," in an address to the Croatian Assembly. Miletic described this as "incomprehensible."

Miletic recalled Gligorov's statement for EL PAIS that the majority of Albanians in Kosovo are asking—at the minimum—for an independent state under an international protectorate.

The DPS president wondered why Gligorov did not react to statements and requests by Albanian ideologists in his own state, where the problem is far greater than in Kosovo.

The SRNA correspondent from Skopje recalls Arben Dzaferi, leader of the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity, as saying that failure to meet their numerous requests would be detrimental to all citizens in FYROM. [passage omitted]

The DPS maintains that the Macedonian state media, with the approval of the current authorities, are revealing territorial claims to Serbia. [passage omitted]

"Such irresponsible statements by Macedonian officials only go to conceal serious and unsolvable problems of an economic and social nature, as well as the arrival of another 1,000 or so U.S. soldiers within UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force]," Miletic said.

FYROM: DPS Leader Says Rugova Often Visits Gligorov

AU2205153296 Skopje MIC in English 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Immediately after the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and FRY, the Macedonian authorities and the president of the state Mr. Gligorov himself, suddenly started getting very interested in the Kosovo question, which actually means direct interference in the internal affairs of FRY," Dragisha Miletich, president of the Democratic Party of Serbs [DPS] in Macedonia stated at yesterday's press conference. Miletich noted that "Ibrahim Rugova is a very frequent guest with President Gligorov."

FYROM: Human Rights Party Leader Gives News Conference

AU2205163196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 22 May Iliya Ilievski, leader of the banned Macedonian Human Rights Party, gave a news conference at the BALKAN NEWS AGENCY.

He said that his appearances in Bulgaria are subjected to an information blackout in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] at the order of the Macedonian Government.

The main topic of the news conference was the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia and the policy of official Bulgaria.

Mr. Ilievski accused the Bulgarian politicians of dissociating themselves from the Human Rights Party. At the same time, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has used documents and data, sent by this party to international organizations.

An investigation of the Khorizont Program of the Bulgarian Radio revealed that the documents in question are documents which Foreign ministry experts have used together with other documents provided by many different sources.

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on the social climate the citizens have the right to self-determination inside the country in order to fulfill their rights. This applies to different autonomies and to various institutions that should be established in order to develop the particularities of self-determination. There are no such institutions in the Republic of Macedonia! There is, for instance, something like editorial offices for the Albanian language in television, or in the press, but they are shrinking every day, because they have neither material nor technical nor human resources. So, we get something that is Albanian, but it is atrophied Albanian!

[Colakovski] You have strongly attacked President Gligorov but you talk about Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK], with great respect. To what is this great care for the Kosovo problems owed?

[Xhafferi] First of all, we deny the untruth. In Paris, President Gligorov said that there is a wise politician in Kosovo who pursues a more moderate policy than the other extremists, who are destabilizing the situation in this region, who aspire to an independent Kosovo or perhaps to Great Albania. This is a lie! Ibrahim Rugova, who is the president of the Republic of Kosovo, was elected in direct and free elections, the same way Gligorov was, and he is not the president of some kind of alternative, because there is not such an institution. Rugova himself is in favor of an independent Kosovo, and he does not have any dilemma about this. On the other hand, Gligorov draws a discrimination between him and the others, who are now extremists, in the same way as Gligorov called us—separatists. The truth is that all the Albanians in this region are in favor of an independent Kosovo. The problem lies in the untruth and not in an emotional affectation of Gligorov or Rugova.

[Colakovski] Are the LDK and Rugova acting as the political mentors of Arber Xhafferi and PDPA?

[Xhafferi] Not at all! Believe me that they are not. Some of the other political parties in Macedonia were asking for the LDK's and Rugova's blessing in the political currents outside Macedonia. We have never asked for their arbitration. We have a deep regard for Rugova and the LDK, but I will openly say that they are not our mentors. We have a strong intellectual elite in our party that is capable of making up its own policy and option, elaborating this option and structuring the party. There are probably more capable personalities in our party than in the LDK.

[Colakovski] Are you aware, for instance, of the danger of an escalation of events in Kosovo and of the possibility of war? Are you aware that with your political statements in this context you are supporting Rugova's policy for an independent Kosovo, although it is a well known fact that the international community has decided that the borders must not be changed?

[Xhafferi] Yes, the international community first of all supported the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Ante Markovic, then it started supporting Tudjman and Milosevic; the international community also supported the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do not have the power to influence these big tendencies that are partitioning states and nations. We have decided to defend ourselves. We are in a position of defense. However, so far we have not managed to defend the partition of the Albanian ethnic corps. You know that we have been divided into several states, whereas before we used to be all together in Yugoslavia.

As far as not changing the borders is concerned, here the international community refers to changing them by force. So they can be changed peacefully, and this is what we are advocating.

[Colakovski] Recently, in one of your party's communications, you stated that 40 percent of the citizens in Macedonia support the referendum for an independent Kosovo. Where did you get this figure from? It has to be admitted that it is quite unreal?

[Xhafferi] There are two aspects here. We think that the official census in Macedonia was not real because we account for at least one third. By this census, 63 percent of the population is Macedonian, while the others are Albanians, Turks, Muslims, Romanies, and so on. We believe that not only the Albanians, but also the Turks and the others support an independent Kosovo and this is the source for my figure.

[Colakovski] There are extensive talks about a "just solution of the Kosovo problem" in which Macedonia is also included. You support all this. However, it also implies the thesis of an overall solution of the Albanian question in the Balkans. What do you mean by this?

[Xhafferi] The overall solution that should ease the whole situation in the Balkans means that once and for all there will be created a land in which the nations cooperate and not compete in the ethnic game. We believe that an overall solution should be found for the Albanian question. The Albanian question can be solved globally in the following way: Kosovo is asking for and is entitled to the right to external self-determination because it used to be a constituent element of the former federation. The Albanians in Macedonia are asking for the right to internal self-determination. So, without changing the borders, they will decide for themselves about their development. A Macedonian in Macedonia

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cannot decide about how and how much the Albanian in Macedonia will be developed.

[Colakovski] What does this internal self-determination that you are talking about mean?

[Xhafferi] It means independent institutions—starting from a university up to institutions that create values, our values that we want to preserve, because we would not like to be assimilated. This is a quite understandable need that is not directed against the Macedonians and the others. All the other related arguments will be simply drowned because the nationalism of the other side that does not want to provide institutions for the development of the special features of the Albanians will be revealed.

So, these very dangerous Albanian tensions in the Balkans will have to be resolved. You probably do not have the statistics, but I believe that the militant spirit of the Albanians is rising daily. If it erupts, it will be dangerous for all of us who are living here. This militant spirit has its grounds, its logic, and emotions because we are not a subject of manufacture, neither are the Macedonians, nor the Serbs, nor the Albanians. We the Albanians are not prepared to carry on with such a masochistic position.

[Colakovski] Is this militant spirit under the control of the ethnic Albaninan parties here or has it gone beyond this framework?

[Xhafferi] For the time being, we are in political control of the situation. After the recent events in Kosovo, however, we realize the danger of losing direct control over the masses because other factors have an influence there. There is a danger that the parties of the Albanians will be transformed into ordinary bureaucratic offices from where come ideas that are not productive. On the other hand, others will have an emotional influence over the nation, and they will eliminate us as political subjects.

[Colakovski] What must the government or the ethnic Albanian parties do to calm down these tensions?

[Xhafferi] The government must find a solution to these requests....

[Colakovski] Is there a recipe at all?

[Xhafferi] Undoubtedly there is. There is a very concrete and precise recipe that is acceptable to both the mind and the heart. It is the fulfillment of the categories of inherited rights of the Albanians in Macedonia, the category of real democratic rights of citizens, and the third categories related to human rights that I already mentioned.

[Colakovski] What do you mean by the formulation "Albanian political subject in Macedonia," a term that has been imposed from outside?

[Xhafferi] We are now in the process of uniting the Albanian political subject. There will come processes of our party's rapprochement with the other ethnic Albanian opposition parties, while the next phase will be with the ruling party, that is PDP. These are processes that we will develop, and we will be very cooperative despite of the previous burdens we have had.

On this occasion, I would like to say that the homogenization of the political subject of the Albanians is not at all directed against Macedonian vital interests. So far we have never cooperated with other anti-Macedonian interests, starting from Greece, Bulgaria, and some other states.

[Colakovski] At the very onset of the democratic processes in Macedonia, there was a big homogenization among the ethnic Albanian parties. Later the parties split. Now you are again talking about homogenization. Is this not a retrogressive process?

[Xhafferi] No, it is not retrogressive. The first homogenization was emotional—on the one side there was us and on the other the Macedonians. There was a referendum on the Macedonian side, there was a referendum on the Albanian side. Nobody can dispute these referendums. The present homogenization is national. We have reasonably concluded that we have been wasting our energy in mutual disputes. A board must be set up, a tutor of the Albanian political subjects, where our strategy, tactics, and mechanisms are worked out with the aim of accomplishing the needs arising from the inherited rights, citizens' rights, and human rights of the Albanians. So, we are very careful here, and I can tell you sincerely that in our discussion there is deep understanding for the international community, which is now tolerating some aspects of repression in Macedonia because it believes that it is better to have a bad peace than a good war!

[Colakovski] You mentioned the referendum of the Albanians. Did you have in mind the illegal referendum on the so-called ilirida, on independence of the western part of Macedonia? Do you still back this project?

[Xhafferi] There is not a political party that can deny a referendum if it does not organize a later one that will annul the former. I can say that for now my political party cannot neglect this. We cannot change the views, because they are the will of the nation. Only another referendum can annul this.

[Colakovski] Will you try to implement the referendum that you are talking about?

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[Xhafferi] It all depends on the problems. The options are still open. It depends on how interethnic relations in Macedonia improve. If we start a productive process of relaxing these relations, and the cornerstone is the law on university education, and if we lose in this segment, then we will either lose all credibility among the nation or we will have to do something else to overcome the deadlock.

[Colakovski] If you withdraw from the institutions of the system does it imply reactivation of the "referendum on ilirida"?

[Xhafferi] Of course! However, there is one thing that you ought to know—the Macedonian authorities will be its generators, and we will bear the consequences all together. It will not be permitted to have only the Albanians suffer the consequences, as it has been the case until now. Our requests are not irrational, they are real!

[Colakovski] Do you consider your request for a "university" in Mala Recica realistic?

[Xhafferi] I think that this request is absolutely rational. If there were more positive thinking about this institution, we could find several aspects that are positive for Macedonia. First, the university is a real need because we do not have the possibility to study in Pristina or Tirana, or in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, Zagreb...in the desired numbers. And we need these numbers. Second, this institution should be incorporated in the educational system of the Republic of Macedonia. So, we are not asking for an institution outside the system. The problem is the language! There is opposition to the establishment of the right to use the Albanian language in the institutions. There is a desire to see the use of the Albanian language atrophy; but there is a growing energy among us to resist the intention to have the Albanians atrophy in Macedonia.

FYROM: Assembly Accepts Public Petition for Referendum

LD2205182296 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 2000 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An official report by Justice Minister Vlado Popovski was submitted to the Macedonian Assembly yesterday. It contains a petition signed by 171,538 adult citizens for a referendum on early elections for deputies to the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly.

Macedonian Assembly Speaker Tito Petkovski announced in a statement today that he has convened the 47th session of the Assembly, which will be held on 4 June. The first point on the agenda is a proposal to call a referendum on the question: Are you in favor of early elections for deputies to the Macedonian Assembly to be held before the end of 1996?

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Poland: Kolodko Confirms Poland To Join OECD 11 Jul

LD2305095896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0700 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister] Grzegorz Kolodko confirmed on his return from Paris that Poland will be received into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] on 11 July. The deputy prime minister talked about this [in Paris] with ministers from OECD member states. He said that the final condition for Poland's joining the OECD is the passing of a law on taxation. This has already been adopted by the Sejm and is now only waiting to be confirmed by the Senate and the president. Senators will discuss amendments to the statute on taxation during a two-day session of the upper chamber of parliament that starts today. This law envisions that Treasury officials could have access to citizens' bank accounts in criminal, fiscal, or administrative proceedings against them.

Poland: Belarusian Version of Solidarity Incident Rejected

LD2205173896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Foreign Ministry has rejected the explanations by the Belarusian side concerning the arrest in Minsk and then the deportation of a Solidarity delegation. Deputy Foreign Minister Stefan Meller handed Valeryy Burskyy, the Belarusian ambassador in Poland, the official stance of the Polish Foreign Ministry on the matter.

Over several days, a special Foreign Ministry team assessed the Belarusian reply to the Polish protest note regarding the Solidarity delegation's arrest in Minsk. On the basis of the Belarusian interpretation of the law and the evidence of the Polish consul, it was ascertained that, because the Solidarity activists were in Belarus at the invitation of the legal trade unions, the visit was an official one, despite the fact that the authorities were not informed of it.

The Polish Foreign Ministry also has a document that confirms that the Belarusian industry minister gave his consent to the trade union rally, with the suggestion that it be held outside the workplace. Marian Krzaklewski made a public statement on open ground near the factory. The Polish Foreign Ministry also rejects Minsk's accusation that the Polish Embassy did not take enough interest in the fate of the delegation. In accordance with diplomatic custom, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry should answer today's note from the Polish side within several days.

Poland: Acting UOP Head Views Policies, Oleksy Case

WS2305103996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 May 96 p 16

[Interview with Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski, acting head of the Polish Office of State Protection, by Anna Marszalek; place and date not given: "I Will Try To Avoid Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marszalek] What do you know about "Milim," "Kat," and other politicians of whom WPROST wrote that they were on Moscow's files as informers of Russian intelligence?

[Kapkowski] This is an interesting thing. These materials need to be ferreted out in the Office of State Protection [UOP]. So far I have failed to come across them.

[Marszalek] Do you think they have been taken out of UOP premises and we are in for yet another espionage scandal?

[Kapkowski] I do not think anyone would decide to pursue another such case.

[Marszalek] Your appointment as UOP head has come at a time when you are seen as an institution that got involved in a political game that turned out to be unprofessional and even ludicrous. In addition, UOP information keeps leaking; this is usually information that is top secret—names of recruited agents.

[Kapkowski] One cannot speak about insufficient professionalism of the entire UOP. Such an accusation can be leveled at only a narrow group of people. Internal proceedings in UOP showed numerous irregularities and errors in their work, both in the planning and implementation of operational tasks, including holding talks with the recruited source, and in approving and controlling those activities and their documentation. It also happened that instructions issued by superiors were carried out imprecisely, their reservations ignored. Recently I was accused of blocking operational activities that were allegedly linked to the "Oleksy case"; however, they were neither sufficiently prepared nor adequately protected. I could not agree to them. After the "Oleksy case" broke out, all of the work principles of UOP were violated, including the nonpolitical character; also, internal regulations were broken and procedures were disregarded. Still, one cannot say that the law was violated.

[Marszalek] [Internal Affairs] Minister Siemiatkowski became very popular with quite a lot of UOP functionaries. You must admit, however, that if one sees that the heads of the Intelligence and Investigation Directorate, as well as the head of the Technical Bureau, are being replaced with other people all at the same time, one

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could get the impression that one is witnessing a purge. In addition, I should mention the appointment of heads of counterintelligence and the Fourth Directorate, which is being set up; this is almost a revolution.

[Kapkowski] This was just a bunch of people who were not widely supported in the services. In addition, they made evident mistakes, which resulted from politics as well as their psychological features, such as high aspirations. We must restore normalcy within UOP. The Fourth Directorate (for economic and organized crime) will be established in September at the latest. Decisions regarding specific appointments can be expected on about 29 May. I would not like to discuss them before they are made.

[Marszalek] However, already today one can say that the Fourth Directorate will most probably be headed by Andrzej Sadlowski, currently deputy director of counterintelligence. The new head of counterintelligence will be Wlodzimierz Orlowski, acting head of this directorate. Who will be in charge of the Intelligence and Investigation Directorate?

[Kapkowski] These decisions have not been made yet. Discussions are still under way.

[Marszalek] What about the UOP officers who handled the Oleksy case? Will any action be taken against them?

[Kapkowski] For the time being, no final decisions have been made. The regulations envision many possibilities: They may be recalled from their offices or transferred to lower posts. They may be warned that they are not fully useful to the service, they may be fired from UOP for the sake of protecting the interests of the services, and, finally, disciplinary action may be taken against them. It cannot be ruled out that they will themselves request to be dismissed. Marian Zacharski has already announced this.

[Marszalek] Who is the "O" agent?

[Kapkowski] We are trying to find out. We are applying all possible procedures to resolve this problem, and we are dealing with this issue without paying any attention to the possible political affiliation of this person. I can say, however, that the "O" agent is certainly neither Oleksy nor Onyszkiewicz.

[Marszalek] Does the name of this "O" begin with this letter?

[Kapkowski] I believe that this letter is accidental. The services avoid such simple associations.

[Marszalek] Is this note credible?

[Kapkowski] In my opinion, it does not meet the requirements of an intelligence document.

[Marszalek] There are inconsistencies in what you are saying. One should either decide that this note is authentic and then order an analysis to find the agent that is mentioned in it, or one should treat it as a false document that does point to a specific person for the sole purpose of discrediting him because it was prepared as part of the operational game—a provocation aimed at some specific person. But you say that the document is false and, at the same time, assert that it does not apply to either Oleksy or Onyszkiewicz.

[Kapkowski] This only is an apparent lack of logic. Documents may be partially true and partially false. We will have to carry out a very thorough analysis of this note.

[Marszalek] Is Yakimishyn alive?

[Kapkowski] From what I have read, I can say that he is and he is very well.

[Marszalek] Is he in danger?

[Kapkowski] I do not think so.

[Marszalek] Is this because he took part in the Russian provocation?

[Kapkowski] I would not like to make any final statements, but his participation in this affair is ambiguous.

[Marszalek] Do you consider him to be a credible source?

[Kapkowski] No, I do not.

[Marszalek] What about the goal? Why did Yakimishyn mislead Zacharski? Why did he provide evidence against Oleksy?

[Kapkowski] The very fact that this caused such great turmoil is a sufficient goal. Russia would not protest the opinion of Poland being an unstable country; this might be an obstacle in our aspirations to join NATO.

[Marszalek] During a previous talk, you decided that the issue probably was a Russian provocation because the Russians realized that attempts were being made to recruit Yakimishyn.

[Kapkowski] I still do not rule out this possibility. I will be able to say more once our internal proceedings are completed. However, it is indeed difficult to imagine that Yakimishyn did something like that on his own.

[Marszalek] Why do you think Yakimishyn did not stay in Poland? Why was he not guaranteed asylum, personal protection, and why was he not persuaded to act as a witness? After all, if one levels a charge at the prime minister, one should have direct proof, such as testimony from a witness.

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[Kapkowski] We are checking this out as well. One might find quite a lot of irregularities in Zacharski's contacts with the recruited source. The source promptly left Poland because his period of accreditation had expired. In that period, work with him should have been very intensive. I think this period was not taken advantage of properly.

[Marszalek] Perhaps it was. You yourself said that in UOP there are no materials on "Milim" and "Kat."

[Kapkowski] I do not claim that there are no such materials; I only say that I have failed to find them. The subject of the internal proceedings is the "Oleksy case."

[Marszalek] How do you evaluate the following hypothesis: Alganov is maintaining contacts with politicians of various parties in Poland. In the report for his head office, he presents information that he has managed to recruit five of them. The head office gives them pseudonyms—"Olin," "Milim," "Kat," and others. In reality, these politicians are not at all spies; they are only maintaining social contacts with Alganov. Alganov receives additional sums of money to cooperate with the alleged agents. However, the case comes out into the open when Yakimishyn appears and tries to take over the alleged agents. "Milim" nearly throws him down the stairs when he offers him cooperation. "Olin's" wife throws him out of her house.

[Kapkowski] We cannot treat ordinary meetings like contacts of spies. This would lead to an absurd; it may turn out that we have a few hundred thousand spies because they are maintaining contacts with representatives of embassies of various countries.

[Marszalek] You got me wrong. I did not say that this contact was a contact between two agents. On the contrary, it follows from the aforementioned hypothesis that Oleksy was not a spy, whereas Alganov might have presented him in his report as a spy—for money, for instance. He might have done this to any other politicians, not only representatives of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

[Kapkowski] Officers may stretch facts or provide exaggerated information on agents; however, this is always verified by the services. The aforementioned hypothesis is one of the possible versions; it is difficult to verify and check out. I realize that the temptation to interpret things this way is quite considerable, but it cannot be related to a man holding such a high office as Oleksy.

[Marszalek] However, we are talking about the years 1990-91. At that time, Oleksy was only a Sejm deputy.

[Kapkowski] To all such services, this is a high office. One cannot say that even at the time of some disorder in the Russian services such a source was not verified and controlled.

[Marszalek] However, you cannot deny that Alganov did maintain contacts with Oleksy.

[Kapkowski] Yes, he did, but there is no evidence to prove that they were of an espionage nature. The "Oleksy case" must come to an end, and I hope the work of UOP will finally get back to normal. The case ended the period of a very tough political fight in the country; it overlapped with the presidential elections. Today this is all over. UOP will not come apart only because a few of its officers made some mistakes, for which they will be brought to account. There are also no fears that our foreign partners will want to quit cooperating with us. UOP has very specific things to do, including withdrawing from the structure of the Internal Affairs Ministry. I will try to run this office in such a way as to not involve it in political games and activities.

[Marszalek] What evaluation did you expect of the internal affairs minister's Political Advisory Committee [PKD]?

[Kapkowski] Members of the PKD represent certain political groups. If I am classified as a person linked to the governing coalition, I will automatically be seen as a person who must not be backed.

[Marszalek] For the time being, some UOP employees look upon you as a man who is linked to Minister Siemiatkowski and who is his obedient henchman.

[Kapkowski] I do not think this is the case. On many issues we had different stands, and decisions were made after lengthy discussions. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that he is my superior.

[Marszalek] In line with the regulations, all that the internal affairs minister can do is supervise the UOP head.

[Kapkowski] This means a lot. The practice is very important.

[Marszalek] You have introduced the practice of full subordination of UOP to the minister?

[Kapkowski] Why do you not give me an example of a situation in which the minister imposed his will on me?

[Marszalek] Here it is: restoration of Adam Hodysz to the post of head of the UOP regional bureau in Gdansk. Was it not a political decision?

[Kapkowski] One decision is not enough to draw such a conclusion. This is really not the most important

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issue, nor is it characteristic of UOP. It is always the case that, when difficult decisions regarding high posts in UOP are to be made, many other considerations are taken into account. Now, is it really so that in the past all decisions were made on the basis of the criterion of professionalism? The important thing is how UOP performs its duties specified by the law. Regional bureaus constitute a very complex structure; there are many of them. One cannot assess all bureaus on the basis of an individual case.

[Marszalek] Did UOP make any other decisions concerning posts in the other regional bureaus?

[Kapkowski] No, it did not. I want to add that I do not feel that the minister imposes any specific solutions on me. I am not observing a process of changing UOP into a political office.

[Marszalek] You are not the first to offer assurances that UOP will be nonpolitical. Meanwhile, UOP functionaries recently went to the WPROST printing house because they were interested in the next issue of this weekly. What did this have to do with the legal tasks of UOP? Perhaps you did this to carry out a political order from the SLD?

[Kapkowski] UOP is not going to control the press. It was an initiative launched by that regional bureau. Incidentally, they went to that building openly. I will do my best to prevent UOP from getting involved in political activity. I come from the group of professionals, not politicians. There is one more advantage I have: I have been working here for so long that I do not have to try to obtain anything. If it turned out that I could not carry out the aforementioned tasks and normalize the work of UOP, I would quit.

[Marszalek] Your quick promotion has been made possible by, among others, Minister Siemiatkowski. Do you not feel indebted to him?

[Kapkowski] I did not ask for this promotion; I will be immodest and say that, over the 28 years of my service in UOP, I have had some achievements. I am familiar with the everyday tasks of an operations officer.

[Marszalek] However, the UOP head is also a politician; in this post, experience gained as an operations officer may prove insufficient.

[Kapkowski] We will have to deal with politics because many of our actions cause political consequences. However, I am accustomed to this kind of politics; the other kind of politics I will try to avoid as much as I can.

Poland: Weekly Questions Credibility of Witness in Oleksy Case

WS2305103896 Poznan WPROST in Polish 26 May 96 pp 26-27

[Article by Joanna Kluzik and Aleksandra Zawlocka: "Whom Did Slawomir Gorzkiewicz Trust? Oleksy's Witness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The testimony of a witness who has not so far been revealed was one of the factors that decided that the investigation of the so-called Oleksy case was closed. It is this person who questions the credibility of [Office of State Protection officer] Marian Zacharski's findings. He claims that the officer fabricated materials to take revenge on Oleksy. As we have managed to establish, Inspector Waclaw Skoczylas, director of the Inspectorate of the Main Police Commandant—that is, the chief of the internal police—and a good acquaintance of the former prime minister, was the witness. He himself came to Supreme Military Prosecutor General Ryszard Michalowski.

In the 1970's, Skoczylas worked at the Main Command of the Civil Police [KG MO] Fifth Department—the Bureau for Combating Economic Crime. He soon became the first secretary of the bureau's party organization. In the 1980's, he was delegated to the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee: He became deputy chief of the Central Commission for Party Control [CKKP]. Jozef Oleksy, who was chief of the Central Committee Audit Commission from 1982 to 1986, was Skoczylas's subordinate at that time. Oleksy held this office despite the fact that the chief of the Central Committee Ideological Department, where Oleksy had previously worked, gave him a negative assessment and suggested "debarring him from any secret materials, particularly those coming from the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

However, this suggestion did not reach the Central Committee Personnel Department. In the CKKP, Skoczylas and Oleksy had access to the most secret and embarrassing information about the party's life and knew their comrades' wrongdoings. Their close friendship, which was not disrupted even by Oleksy's "banishment" to Biala Podlaska (1987-89), dates from that time.

At the end of 1985, Skoczylas returned to the KG MO and was promoted to the office of director of the Bureau for Combating Economic Crime. An individual named Mitsenko, a representative of the USSR Interior Ministry who was delegated to cooperate with the KG MO, frequently visited his office at that time. Previously, he was the interior minister of one of the Soviet republics. Formally, the contacts between the high-ranking functionary of Soviet services and the civil

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police were to contribute to an exchange of experience in combating economic crime. Over time, it became clear that Mitsenko's interests were much broader.

After 1989, his interests focused on a trade union of policemen, which was being established at that time. The Soviet liaison officer's visits to Skoczylas's office became increasingly frequent.

In the era of the contract Sejm [elected in 1989], Mitsenko would visit the KG MO nearly every day.

After the civil police became the police, Leszek Lamparski, the new main commandant (previously the chief of the Interior Ministry Personnel Department and [former Interior Minister] Kiszczak's confidant), extended Mitsenko's permanent pass, which enabled him to enter the police building uncontrolled. And only the next leadership of the ministry, surprised by the privileges of the Soviet Interior Ministry's envoy, annulled the pass in July 1991.

In 1990, Skoczylas tried to move to the Office of State Protection, which was just being established at that time, but was not admitted. He has always maintained contacts with Oleksy and has always boasted of this friendship. It was valuable, at least because, under Solidarity governments, Oleksy was a member of the Sejm Commission for Administration and Internal Affairs (1989-90) and the Political Advisory Committee under the interior minister (1992), and in 1990 he became a member of the commission supervising the selection of voivodship commandants. When he became prime minister, it was expected that Skoczylas would be promoted to the office of police chief. As WPROST informers claim, however, he himself did not want this responsible office. He was promoted to the office of chief of internal control, which was subordinated only to the main commandant.

Skoczylas, as informal tennis champion of the police, often visited Mera courts, where various "diplomats" would show up.

Both [Russian intelligence officer] Alganov and Zacharski used to go there.

According to Skoczylas's testimony, Zacharski disclosed to him that he vied for the office of chief adviser or chief of the prime minister's office but was turned down, and thus he vowed not to forgive Oleksy for this humiliation. There was no confrontation between Skoczylas and Zacharski before the prosecutor, although it was repeatedly scheduled. Zacharski came from Switzerland at every request to learn that his adversary was absent.

Perhaps it was the long friendship with Oleksy that compelled Skoczylas to voice his opinion on this case. Our informers even suggest that he was guided by a feeling of responsibility because it was he who could be the "godfather" of Oleksy's informal contacts with envoys from Moscow's Interior Ministry.

[On 22 May, Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish carries on page 1 a 200-word report by "A.M." saying that "people supervising the preliminary procedures by the Supreme Office of Military Prosecutor have found no grounds to reopen the investigation of the 'Oleksy case.'"

["The deputy supreme military prosecutor yesterday instructed the Prosecutor's Office of the Pomeranian Military District in Bydgoszcz to start 'verifying' the case of Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz revealing to Jozef Oleksy the full version of the decision to dismiss the investigation and the name of the Russian intelligence officer recruited by Marian Zacharski."]

Poland: UOP Allegedly Spies on German Minority Activists

WS2205134596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22 May 96 p 2

[Article by Krzysztof Baranowski: "Without Traces. Does UOP Spy on the German Minority?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Unknown perpetrators in Opole broke into the office of the Union of German Social-Cultural Associations [UGSCA]. Representatives of the German minority maintain that this was done by the Polish special services. "We are under constant surveillance," German activists say.*

The break-in took place at the UGSCA building on 1 May Street in Opole. "This was a very discreet job, virtually without any trace. The culprits, however, left (most likely lost in haste) a small case with a set of precision picklocks and appliances for opening all kinds of locks," UGSCA office director Joachim Niemann says. "After finding it, we checked the documents and found evident traces that they were examined. Aside from this, nothing disappeared," he adds.

Initially, minority organization leaders did not intend to publicize this event, but it was revealed to local press journalists. It turned out then that many German minority activists and politicians representing this minority are under surveillance of the special services.

Senator Gerhard Bartodziej stated that his telephone calls were tapped. While calling home from abroad, he could clearly hear the so-called wiretap [przesluch]—a tape recorder connected to the telephone line affects the

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telephone call. The senator also maintains that there was a break-in at his house; the culprits erased data in his computer.

According to Deputy Henryk Kroll, chairman of the German Cultural-Social Association in Opole Silesia, the special services' surveillance of minority leaders dates back to 1994. The then chief of the Interior Ministry, Andrzej Milczanowski, specified the German minority as a potential threat to the state. He mentioned this in his interview to POLITYKA in June 1994.

Two years ago, there was a much publicized case of detecting an illegal printing house at Dziewkowice near Strzelce Opolskie, which printed publications of the National Offensive nationalist organization. The printing house was organized by three young Germans from the FRG. The Polish authorities were told about their activity by the BND [Federal Intelligence Service]. The nationalists were expelled from Poland, but they had managed to print their materials for a year. Deputy Kroll, both then and now, definitely denied any ties between the minority and this group. He also accused the local administration of not taking resolute action against the National Offensive nationalists. In his opinion, this increased dislike of the minority. Surveillance was an official indication of this dislike.

Edward Kud, chief of the Regional Office of State Protection [UOP] in Opole, denies any actions against this group. Maria Boral, of the Interior Ministry Press Bureau, also asserts that UOP does not surveil (including telephone tapping) any Polish senator.

According to unofficial information, German minority politicians will try to explain this incident in the parliamentary forum.

Poland: Diplomats Discuss Problems of Poles in Lithuania

LD2205202296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1409 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 22 May (PAP)—The Lithuanian ambassador to Poland, Antanas Valionis, and the general consul, Sarunas Adomavicius, told reporters on Wednesday about some of the problems facing the Polish minority in Lithuania, including the implementation of the law of the Lithuanian parliament in the matter of so-called Greater Vilnius and the decision of the Lithuanian minister of education to extend the scope of Lithuanian as the state language.

The Lithuanian diplomats thought the aim of the meeting with representatives of the Polish press was to clear up misunderstandings and insinuations made in the Polish mass media following decisions made by the Lithuanian authorities in April of this year. The Polish press had printed a statement by the Borderland Organizations' Federation in Lithuania in which the Lithuanian authorities were accused of acting in a hostile manner toward the Polish minority—in other words, of passing a law on extending the administrative boundaries of Vilnius, which, according to the authors of the statement, boiled down to the creation of legal foundations that would make it possible to take land away from Polish peasants living in the Vilnius area. This also led to the dispersal of "Polish" territory, making it impossible for Poles to elect their own self-governing or parliamentary representatives, claims the Polish minority in Lithuania.

The Lithuanian consul said that the law on expanding the capital of Lithuania would encompass about 15,000 people, of which 55 percent were Lithuanians, 34 percent Poles, and 11 percent other nationalities. He also added that a law on the return of assets to former landowners resident in Lithuania had been "actively" implemented in this area. Out of approximately 21,000 applications submitted, more than 2,000 had already been examined positively, and more than 5,000 persons had already had land "measured out," which they could use while enjoying right of ownership. People numbering 2,200 had applied to have land returned to them in the area that had now become part of Vilnius. However, the embassy representatives were unable to give details about how many of these people had Polish nationality. But they added that the expansion of the borders of Vilnius was affecting the increase in land prices in this area and that this would benefit the new owners of the land. They gave assurances that, once the law was introduced, the principles governing taxation would not be changed. "The Soviet authorities had carried out the process of nationalization," recalled the consul, stressing that the Lithuanian authorities had undertaken "the difficult duty of covering the cost of returning the land."

The ambassador stated that in Lithuania a considerable number of Poles and Russians living there did not know the Lithuanian language and that this was the reason the authorities had decided to use statutory measures to implement the program of spreading Lithuanian as the state language. Young people of Polish nationality, after years of having been taught in Polish, were unable to function in Lithuanian institutions or converse with Lithuanians, claimed Valionis. He added that reports alleging that the names of Polish schools were being "wiped out" had been unconfirmed. He confirmed that Polish schools would be able to continue to keep their records in Polish but that this would have to be alongside Lithuanian. He pointed out that, despite the proposal that the geography and history of Lithuania be

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taught in the state language (that is, in Lithuanian), they were still being taught in Polish at Polish schools.

Valionis reported that the Union of Polish Teachers in Lithuania was being treated the same way as other Lithuanian organizations and that, like them, it had to pay for the premises it rented from the state, to which until now it had had free access. After its creation, the Ministry of Culture in Lithuania had set up offices on the premises, which the union had been using.

The ambassador said the fact that the Lithuanian side had been able to agree with the Polish Ministry of Education that there would be no obstacles put in the way of Lithuanian schools opening in Poland and that the Ministry of Education would ensure that the Lithuanians got textbooks in Lithuanian was a big success. He recalled that 180 titles of Polish textbooks given free to Poles had already been printed in Lithuania, whereas not a single textbook in Lithuanian had been printed in Poland.

The Lithuanian diplomats stressed that they were open to dialogue with Poland and that they regarded relations between the two countries as being good. The fact that about 60 interstate agreements, including a treaty on friendly relations, had already been signed was evidence of this.

Poland: Minister Views Education for Ethnic Lithuanians

WS2305081696 Tallinn BNS in English 1915 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, May 22, BNS—Poland's minister for national education, Jerzy Wiatr, has made an assurance that a Lithuanian school will be opened in the settlement of Sejny as soon as there are enough Lithuanian children to attend it. The minister added that more new Lithuanian schools could be opened in Poland if necessary.

Wiatr, who is also a member of the Polish parliament, met Lithuanian ambassador to Poland Antanas Valionis and General Consul Sarunas Adomavicius in Warsaw Wednesday.

The sides agreed that Lithuania and Poland are paying increasingly more attention to the needs of ethnic minorities in the two countries. They noted, however, that the ethnic minorities enjoy unequal conditions—the network of Lithuanian schools in Poland is badly developed and the schools lack textbooks in Lithuanian.

The Lithuanian Embassy in Warsaw says that the Polish minister was made aware that not a single new textbook has been published for Lithuanian schools in Poland since 1989. In Lithuania all Polish schools are supplied with textbooks for forms 1 through 12 free of charge.

It was also stated at the meeting that Poland still does not have a law on ethnic minorities, while Poland's 1994 Law on State Language does not comply with those paragraphs of the Lithuanian-Polish interstate treaty that define the situation of the respective ethnic minorities in each country.

Poland: Sejm Commission on U.S. Hellfires, Defense Budget

WS2205130196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 22 May 96 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "How We Advertise at NATO; Defense Ministry Still on a Diet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka has said of the Hellfire II missiles: "The whole issue of purchasing armaments was a mess."

The deputy head of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] made this unexpected statement at yesterday's session of the Sejm Defense Commission. His superior, Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, had claimed all along that everything was fine.

Union of Labor Deputy Tomasz Nalecz said that not letting the U.S. Hellfire missiles take part in the bidding [as published] for equipment to be purchased for the Polish Armed Forces "cast a shadow on the image of Poland in the eyes of NATO allies." "We have made the worst of possible impressions: Polish military officials have been trying to have the U.S. embargo on supplies of the Hellfire II missiles lifted for a year. They mobilized the entire pro-Polish lobby in Washington only now to tell the Americans that they are late," said Nalecz. "I agree with you," stated Karkoszka.

The commission highly appraised the preliminary declaration of obligations Poland wants to enter into with NATO and approved the expectations we have of the alliance. The document was submitted to NATO in April.

Outlays on the MON will not grow in the immediate future. Poland intends to increase the defense budget by 2 percent on personnel and by 3 percent on armament. The overall outlays on defense will be lower than 2.3 percent of the GNP. The deputies were astonished because they had ruled something quite different in February of last year—namely, that beginning in 1997 outlays on defense were to reach 3 percent of the GNP.

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Poland: Interior Ministry To Establish Air Component

LD2205203496 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1542 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 22 May—An agreement on the setting up and operating principles of an air component of the public order services at the Internal Affairs Department was signed on today by Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski and Maritime Economy Minister Boguslaw Liberadzki.

According to Colonel Kazimierz Pogorzelski from the MSW [Internal Affairs Ministry], the helicopters used so far by the police and the border guards flew within the structure of the Vistulan Military Units of the MSW under Air Force regulations. In accordance with international conventions, public order services' aviation is to operate under separate regulations, which fall between the military and civilian regulations. Consequently, one of the purposes of the agreement is to adapt our law to international standards.

The Public Order Services Aviation Inspectorate is to be established at the MSW soon. According to MSW spokesman Ryszard Hincza, the establishment of this component will make it possible to coordinate and utilize more effectively all aircraft, including helicopters, in the field of public safety. This concerns equally the protection of the Polish borders and police and fire brigade operations—for instance, patrolling roads and forests, surveilling demonstrations, and chasing after criminals. In the first instance, the MSW aviation will be equipped with four new Kania (modified Mi-2) helicopters, two each for the police and the border guards.

Poland: Government Criticizes Central Bank Policies

WS2205143996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 22 May 96 p 1

[Articl by Konrad Sadurski, "PSK": "The Government Attacks the NBP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday the prime minister and the government criticized low profits and high salaries at the National Bank of Poland [NBP]. Ministers have been attacking the NBP for the past several days.*

Yesterday morning, on the "Signals of the Day" radio program, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz made a number of bitter comments about the NBP. He is concerned about the low profits the central bank is making. In 1995, each NBP employee received an average of 45 million zlotys [Z] in cash awards. "Should awards be that high when projected profit is not reached?" asked the prime minister.

In the afternoon, the government only "generally approved the NBP balance for 1995, and the topic will be taken up again by the government," said Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska.

Jakubowska also criticized high bonuses and salaries, pointing out that heads of departments at the NBP earn as much as an under secretary of state (Z3,400, as Witold Kozinski, deputy president of the NBP, later told the media).

Many ministers claim this is too much. The government will consider whether it can interfere with profit sharing at the NBP so that more money could reach the State Treasury. The legal bureau of the Office of the Council of Ministers and NBP legal advisers are to issue their opinions.

As Jakubowska assured us, NBP employees need not fear that the government will take away last year's bonuses from them. If any changes are made, they will concern the profit made in 1996.

The NBP was to pay more than Z3.2 billion from its 1995 profits to the budget. The actual amount, however, will be no more than Z2.7 billion. The bank is projecting to pay a paltry Z300 million on profits in 1996—six times less than planned.

Why are profits so small? For some time now, the NBP has been preventing an emission of inflation-generating masses of money into the market. The NBP is eliminating the excess of money from the market by borrowing from commercial banks. Interests rates are consuming the NBP profits.

Some of the government experts are telling the NBP that its profit will rise if they lower interest rates. Commercial banks would follow suit, and the entire economy would benefit.

The NBP claims that this is impossible for the time being because lower credits for the economy generate inflation, which is high enough as it is. Over the first four months [of this year], prices increased by 8.9 percent. In April alone, bread prices rose 8.1 percent.

For the past few days, ministers and representatives of the governing coalition—Deputy Prime Minister Miroslaw Pietrewicz; Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers; and Polish Peasant Party Chairman Waldemar Pawlak—have fiercely criticized the NBP for the high zloty rate, which is ruining exporters.

The NBP retorts that the growth of the zloty rate is the result of an inflow of huge amounts of money from trade in the border regions and that rate policies are implemented in agreement with the government.

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Romania: Iliescu Suggests 29 Sep for Parliamentary Elections

AU2305105996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 23 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night's meeting at Cotroceni Palace between President Ion Iliescu and the leaders of parliamentary parties—except for the representatives of the Greater Romania Party [PRM], who were absent—concluded without concrete results. According to the head of state, the purpose of the meeting was to conduct a technical discussion in connection with this year's electoral calendar. The participants agreed that, within one week, the government should converge all proposals and suggestions made by the parties and launch a legislative initiative to adopt a law on the parliamentary and presidential elections, which should amend the law currently in force. However, he did not rule out the preservation of the current law on the parties.

Regarding the separation of the legislative and presidential ballots, President Ion Iliescu said that this would result in a high degree of absenteeism, if the electorate were repeatedly called to cast their votes—three ballots in the fall [main and run-off elections], on top of the two in June for the local elections. Mr. Ion Iliescu considers that 29 September, as a date for the elections, is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and of the Law on the Parties and the Law on Elections.

The statements made to our correspondents by the leaders of various parties reflect a different interpretation of the constitutional provisions. Victor Surdu, president of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR] believes that 3 November is the most suitable date for the elections and that the electoral threshold, to be set by the Parliament, should be 4 percent.

Mr. Ion Diaconescu, leader of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD], who initially announced that he will suggest the separation of the legislative and presidential elections, said he has allowed himself to be convinced of the inherent difficulties of such a measure, which would nevertheless have been possible if the parliamentary elections were held before the local ones. Regarding the possible date for the elections, he favors the period between 26 September and 26 October.

From the Social Democratic Union [USD], Messrs. Adrian Severin [vice president of the Democratic Party-PD] and Sergiu Cunescu [president of the Social Democratic Party of Romania-PSDR] said that they favor holding the legislative and presidential elections on time, that is between September and October, and also at the same time, so as to permit a big electoral turnout, since this is the only way to obtain the change propounded by these groupings.

Adrian Paunescu, first vice president of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] termed the discussion as futile and noted that for the first time he is leaving the Cotroceni Palace deeply dissatisfied. He jokingly said, quote, new arrangements on the political scene have been exposed at the meeting. But Mr. Horia Rusu, president of the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93] openly lent support to this idea, by expressing his surprise at the convergence of ideas between Messrs. Ion Iliescu and Ion Diaconescu, something which, in the PL'93 opinion, confirms the speculations about an understanding struck between the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR].

Nicolae Manolescu, leader of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] said that if the Constitution and the laws were to be observed, then elections cannot be held before the start of November. Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], suggested the period between St. Nicholas [6 December] and Christmas for a valid date. Regarding the electoral threshold, PUNR favors 3 percent for individual parties, and for alliances, three multiplied by the number of member parties.

Romania: Van With Secret Documents 'Vanished' in Bulgaria

AU2205122496 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 20 May 96 p 12

[Report by Ioana Theodoru: "A Van Carrying Romanian Secret Documents Vanishes in the Bulgarian Locality of Veliko Trnovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Approximately three days ago, in an area close to Veliko Trnovo in Bulgaria, a Romanian van taking secret documents to Turkey vanished without a trace.

The vehicle, which was the property of an engineering factory in Moreni, was carrying documentation on prototype 3 of the RN 95-type armored carrier, which is jointly produced for NATO by Romanian and Turkish companies, as well as several Romanian passports.

This news came from unofficial sources and all of our efforts to verify it yesterday were thwarted.

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Romania: Babiuc on 'Immense' Number of SRI Wiretappings

AU2205165596 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 20 May 96 p 3

[MEDIAFAX report: "Victor Babiuc: In Romania the Number of Authorized Telephone Wiretapping Cases Is Immense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement made on Saturday in Suceava to a MEDIAFAX press agency correspondent, Victor Babiuc, executive vice president of the PD [Democratic Party], said the number of telephone wiretapping cases is very large.

"As I saw it, in 1995 the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] was authorized to wiretap the telephone conversations of 850 people. This number seems immense to me," said Babiuc.

He added that none of the persons whose telephones were wiretapped had made any attempts against national security. "None of us was able to see that national security was genuinely in danger, or that such a large number of wiretapping cases would be justified," mentioned Babiuc.

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Slovenia: Drnovsek Said To Support Transitional Government

AU2205152796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Marijan Podobnik, president of the Slovene People's Party, explained the initiative for the formation of a transitional technical government. The party has already contacted Dr. France Arhar, who is supposed to head this government. According to Podobnik, [Prime Minister] Janez Drnovsek also commented positively on such a government. Drnovsek understood the initiative as meaning he himself would be the prime minister-designate. The constructive no-confidence vote in the government cannot be ruled out; however, it would not help resolve problems, Podobnik also said.

Slovenia: Military Leaders Give President Annual Briefing

AU2205161496 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 9 May 96 p 2

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 8 May—Following the dispute about the authority of the state president, which was brought to an end by the Law on Defense (according to it the president only has formal authority regarding the army), the Slovene Army General Staff commander, defense minister, and supreme commander of the armed forces met yesterday. A public announcement of this meeting seems rather unusual in light of all the earlier problems.

A brief statement for the public says that Milan Kucan, president of the Republic of Slovenia and the supreme commander of the Slovene Army, received Defense Minister Jelko Kacin and General Staff Commander Albin Gutman with his aides. Kucan was briefed about the combat readiness of our soldiers and other topical issues in the armed forces' activity and development, the president's office has reported.

As Albin Gutman, commander of the Slovene Army General Staff, said today, the rules of procedure envisage that the Defense Ministry reports on the Slovene Army's combat readiness once a year. This was done yesterday. It involved a routine annual report to the supreme commander. According to the General Staff commander, the president assessed the [illegible]tion in the Slovene Army positively. The General Staff commander presented a report on the elements of combat readiness while Jelko Kacin spoke about the realization of the basic development programs.

According to the Law on Defense the supreme commander does not have the authority to appoint the General Staff commander (he is appointed by the government on the proposal of the minister) nor has the national security council been set up. The state operational defense headquarters envisaged by the new Law on Defense, which functions with the prime minister, is a sort of surrogate for this. The president, thus, lacks authority in the defense realm, although some consider him the most influential and best informed man on the situation in the army. The experts are still polemicizing over the formation of the national security council, a body familiar in many parliamentary democracies, and primarily on the appointment and the dismissal of the General Staff commander, which should not be a political position linked to the change of ministers. "The battle for the Pentagon" and command over the Slovene Army has ended with the symbolic, declarative authority (that is, the "English queen" status) for the state president, who is formally the supreme military commander. [passage omitted]

Officially, we were not able to learn any details about the content of the talks between the president and the supreme commander, the defense minister, and the General Staff commander. The Defense Ministry public liaison office referred us to the office of the president, where they confirmed that that office was in charge of releasing information. However, they did not say much more than this.

Slovenia: Military Secret Service Head Expected To Be Replaced

AU2205174196 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 21 May 96 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Chief of Military Secret Service To Be Replaced Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 20 May—Sources in the Defense Ministry expect a reshuffle soon at the head of the military intelligence service, which is headed by Marjan Miklavcic. The defense minister's cabinet neither confirmed nor denied this information. Marjan Miklavcic was unavailable today, his chief of staff Zoran Klemencic did not know anything about it and suggested that we turn to the Public Liaison Service because for the time being, as he said, they did not have any information.

Marjan Miklavcic arrived at the helm of the OVS [expansion not given], which is the new abbreviation for the better known VOMO—the Security Organ of the Defense Ministry—on 18 May 1994. [passage omitted]

The Defense Minister argued in favor of his appointment as "a cadre reinforcement of the Defense Ministry's security organ." Brane Lukac, who heads the counterintelligence sector, denied speculations that he would take over the military intelligence service.

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The intelligence sector of the military service is headed by Vladimir Saponja. It is known that Miklavcic came in conflict with the civilian military service, headed by Drago Fers, although the cooperation between the two services, the civilian and the military one, has been rather exemplary for some time, also as concerns the two chiefs who had often "exchanged information."

The military secret service and the Defense Ministry were criticized for containing too many sympathizers of the former defense minister [Janez Jansa]. [passage omitted]

Over the next few days we will be able to verify whether the replacement will actually occur since the government cadre council will decide about such matters at the proposal of the minister or the government, which is in charge of the appointment of the service's chief. [passage omitted]

Publicly we did not notice any differences between the minister and the secret service director. The change at the helm of the military intelligence service, according to the official assurances, has not been carried out yet, which does not mean that we cannot anticipate it in the near future. [passage omitted]

The replacement of Marjan Miklavcic, if it goes ahead, will definitely come as a surprise because Miklavcic belonged to the circle of [Defense Minister] Kacin's closes aides. On top of this following the proclamation of independence Miklavcic was employed as the security chief at Brnik airport, which was at the time an important arms transport point.

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Federal

FRY: Seselj Has 'Documents That Incriminate Milosevic'

BR2305105896 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 May 96 p 8

[Interview with Serbian nationalist leader Vojslav Seselj by Massimo Nava in Belgrade; date not given: "Milosevic a Traitor to Us Serbs"

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—*The list of people being investigated by the tribunal in The Hague includes Vojslav Seselj, 43, leader of the Serbian ultranationalist and one of the leaders of the militia forces that fought in Bosnia. But this blond giant with icy eyes wants to go to The Hague on his own account—to bring charges against Serbian President Milosevic, the "traitor of the Serbian cause."* [passage omitted]

The small fry brought to The Hague, Karadzic and Mladic indicted, and a Nobel peace prize for Milosevic! This is absurd. Karadzic and Mladic are the finest that the Serbian motherland has produced in the 20th century. If they are brought to trial, so must Milosevic. The officials of the Pale Republic are still paid by Belgrade.

[Nava] Why is Milosevic a traitor?

[Seselj] Because he encouraged the Serbs to wage war and to rebel in Krajina and Bosnia. He armed them, financed them, supported them, and then abandoned them, arguing that he had nothing to do with it and that he facilitated peace. This is how he betrayed national interests.

[Nava] Is that what you will tell the judges in The Hague?

[Seselj] I do not need to prove my innocence of anything. I took part in all stages of the war, at the front I commanded over 1,000 volunteers, armed and equipped with Milosevic's support. If anything happens to me, I have documents that incriminate Milosevic, proof that he directed operations.

[Nava] What proof?

[Seselj] I will speak when the time is ripe. Now I want to protect Karadzic. It is a fact that the orders came from Belgrade. Mladic and the other Bosnian Serb officers carried out the plans drawn up by staff headquarters in Belgrade. Karadzic was not in charge of the army.

[Nava] It is well known that the paramilitary militias committed the worst crimes. You yourself espoused the theory of ethnic cleansing. Do you admit that you are one of the people responsible for the war?

[Seselj] War is a method, not a crime. In the West you treat war and crimes equally. But if we want to talk about criminals, they are Clinton, Genscher, De Michelis, the advocates of the war in the Balkans. I would even include the pope, who called for the bombardment of our villages. If we are talking about crimes, they were committed by all sides, but especially by the Croats and Muslims. It has been said that the Serbs raped thousands of Muslim women, but one of them who gave an account of the rape on television went on to give birth to a black child! I did not put forward the theory of ethnic cleansing. It was a consequence. I support the idea of the Greater Serbia, because Bosnia and Croatia are not nations; they should not exist. But that is no crime!

[Nava] Does Srebrenica not remind you of anything?

[Seselj] I have no precise information. Be that as it may, I do not deny the massacres. What I say is that there must be evidence in the case of each person accused and that the political responsibilities must be established.

[Nava] You deny the massacres, but accuse Milosevic of having provoked them. Please explain.

[Seselj] I do not deny actions that were committed by everyone. I am saying that there is no evidence against my men and that it does not make sense to accuse Karadzic. Milosevic is the proper target!

[Nava] So do you think that Karadzic and Mladic will be sanctified in the future?

[Seselj] The Serbian people are with Karadzic. His resignation was a gesture to alleviate international pressure, but I think it is Milosevic who will disappear from the political scene first. The West needs him now, but it will drop him later. As for General Mladic, I am pleased that yesterday he came to Belgrade, to his own land. It was a noble gesture to attend the funeral of General Djukic, another victim of the tribunal in The Hague. I respect Mladic, but I had a major disagreement with him, because he acted on orders from Milosevic, who then dropped him and betrayed him by authorizing the NATO bombardments.

[Nava] If this is the case, why did Milosevic not have you arrested, as envisaged by the Dayton accords?

[Seselj] First, because Milosevic would pay for such a decision. Second, because his signature in Dayton is worth no more than that of the governor of Texas. Yugoslavia signed nothing!

[Nava] Many witnesses have given evidence relating to the activities of armed gangs of volunteers. Those under your orders, a new version of the "Chetniks," or the "White Eagles" and the "Tigers" of commander Arkan.

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[Seselj] I have already told you about my men. As for Arkan, it comes back to Milosevic. The "Tigers" were recruited among the Serbian police. As far as I know, Arkan is chiefly a wheeler-dealer, a little Balkan Al Capone who organized looting for himself and for his men. Suffice it to see the villa where he lives in Belgrade!

FRY: SPS, JUL Discuss Future Cooperation

AU2205195796 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The leaders of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the Yugoslav Left [JUL] today held a joint meeting. The delegations were led by SPS Vice President Nikola Sainovic and JUL President Ljubisa Ristic.

The participants in the talks concluded that an increasing number of people is supporting the ideas of the modern left-wing parties at home and abroad, and that the trends of mobilization and cooperation among the left parties from all countries has gained in strength. This is confirmed by the recent meeting of the left-wing parties from the EU in Paris.

During the meeting, the SPS and JUL leaderships discussed cooperation in all walks of life and work.

It was concluded that the program platforms and activities of the SPS and JUL express a high degree of agreement on the main issues of the functioning and development of our society, and that appropriate coordinated activity and solidarity in the realization of the identical tenets of the Left is in the interest of all citizens. These, above all, are: a life based on equality, equal rights for all citizens regardless of their nationality, and the development a society of social justice.

The participants in today's meeting exchanged views on and agreed to cooperate in the realization of the tasks in the spheres of economy, agriculture, health service, education, and especially the economic-social issues that affect every day life of common people.

The talks were attended by Mirjana Markovic, president of the JUL Directorate; Slobodan Cerovic, member of the Directorate and president of the Belgrade Committee of the JUL; Zivko Sokolovacki, member of the Directorate and coordinator for the Vojvodina JUL; Mustafa Dzigal, member of the JUL Directorate; Gorica Gajevic, secretary general of the SPS; Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic and Bosko Perosevic, vice presidents of the SPS; Nedeljko Sipovac, member of the SPS Executive Committee; and SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic.

FRY: SPS, JUL Coordination Meeting Reported

LD2205231696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2213 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 22 (TANJUG)—Leaderships of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) said in a meeting here Wednesday their coordinated activity and solidarity contributed to the achievement of identical goals of the left.

SPS is the ruling party in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its republic Serbia, while JUL, a non-parliamentary movement, rallies more than twenty leftist parties.

The meeting said a growing number of people both at home and in the world were committed to ideas of the modern left, and said there was an increasing number of meetings of leftist parties throughout the world leading to the strengthening of ties among them.

The leaderships said they would coordinate activity in achieving identical goals of the left, in particular as regards the life based on the principle of equality, equal rights for all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin and the building of social justice in society.

They agreed to cooperate in the sphere of economy, agriculture, health care service, education and especially in solving economic and social issues related to man's everyday life, said a statement issued by the press section of the sps central committee.

The SPS leadership was headed by party Vice-President Nikola Sainovic, while the JUL leadership was headed by party president Ljubisa Ristic.

The meeting was attended also by President of the JUL Directorate Mirjana Markovic, wife of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and by SPS Secretary-General Gorica Gajevic.

FRY: Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict Reaching Final Stage

96BA0278C Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 pp 36-37

[Article by Branka Plamenac: "The Arrow Is in Flight"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only four years since proclamation of the FRY Constitution relations between its members, Serbia and Montenegro, appear disrupted to the point where it seems that a final parting of the ways is only a question of the near future. Will the divorce of the "two eyes in one head" and achievement of Montenegro's independence, an idea increasingly present in

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its public discourse, take place "peacefully and with dignity," or will the brother republic experience the destiny of the others in the former Yugoslavia, who opposed Belgrade's policy at that time? is the question that is put most frequently today. Symptoms of a sudden chilling of relations between official Belgrade and Podgorica are inescapably reminiscent of those in the recent history of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The war in Croatia and Bosnia was preceded by the interruption of the main news broadcasts, first TV Zagreb, then TV Sarajevo, and the other studios, in the same way as today, TV Novi Sad or Pale are cut off with an expansion of the peace policy of RTS [Radio-TV Serbia].

Djukanovic Was the Last Straw

Expulsion of the news program of Montenegrin TV from the schedule of the country's leading television studio, Radio-TV Serbia, occurred on the fourth anniversary of proclamation of the joint state of Serbs and Montenegrins, although citizens of the smaller republic see no good reason for that hurried decision, because the sister television studios differ not a whit in their consistent disinformation of their publics.

There is an abundance of fresh examples and evidence that the joint state is breaking apart along all the seams, but denying the viewers of Serbia the Montenegrin news program is one of the most specific.

The indisputable "culprit" for the unexpected decision of RTS, and, of course, the Serbian authorities, is the Montenegrin prime minister Milo Djukanovic and his most recent provocative political activity, which has been angering the Belgrade regime. Djukanovic, vice president of the incumbent Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] and prime minister of Montenegro, is at the moment the only representative of the administration team who has decided to risk keen public criticism of the (non)functioning of the federal state and its agencies, Belgrade's foreign policy, Serbian resistance to the inevitable process of privatization, and, what seems most important, he has unambiguously opposed the illegitimate presence and expansion of the JUL [United Yugoslav Left] in the highest bodies of government in the country or the possible visit to Montenegro of the left from Serbia.

The drop which overflowed the cup of patience of the regime toward the excursions of the young politician from Podgorica was certainly his support of Governor Avramovic in his effort to return Yugoslavia to international financial institutions without losing valuable time over the question of succession and continuity of the FRY. Djukanovic shook up the Yugoslav political scene quite a bit with his assessments of the current political situation in the shaky federation, through what has now become a famous interview in SRPSKA REC. His unexpected statements are still shaking both the Serbian and Montenegrin communities with equal intensity, instilling true confusion in the ranks of members of the DPS. Djukanovic's decision to be the first, as he has been on certain other occasions, among the domestic incumbent politicians to break with the practice of ignoring the opposition press and to use just such a paper to communicate the disturbing news like the news about his own break with his ideological past or the news that at the end of his term he will leave all government office was received with great pain.

A Split in the Top Government Leadership of Montenegro

Djukanovic's interview largely determined the course of debates in the marathon session of the Montenegrin Assembly, which was an additional reason for removing the Montenegrin TV News from the repertoire of the RTS, because the deputies of the complex Montenegrin opposition found in the statements of the high government official confirmation of their views concerning the character of the current regime. It seems that it was only still from TV Montenegro, originating with deputies of the Montenegrin opposition, that one could hear in Serbia harsh, well-documented, and frontal condemnation of the Belgrade regime and the disastrous policy it has been conducting, a regime which is rejecting all reforms and democratic change, looking for the future in the Far East. The People's Party, the Liberal Alliance, and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro are unified in their assessment that that kind of federal state has not been justifying its existence, that it only serves the incumbent parties as a suitable excuse and cover for their own incompetence and ineffectiveness. Given that kind of Montenegrin resistance to the way the FRY is being governed, Serbia simply turned off the power of the Montenegrin TV transmitter.

The consequences of Djukanovic's most recent undertakings have become very evident: the cooling of relations with Belgrade, the discontinuation of the Montenegrin news program, and the revelation of the polarization and split in the top leadership of the DPS in Montenegro, on which the opposition is particularly insisting, observing that the position of the DPS has been drastically weakened in an election year. Socialists in Montenegro, accordingly, do not have the same political strength with or without Milo Djukanovic. Obviously alluding to the fact that in his views the prime minister is in the minority in the top leadership of the DPS, Dragan Soc, vice president of the People's Party, said from the speaker's rostrum in the Assembly: "The split in the top government leadership of Montenegro

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is obvious. The president of the Republic is saying one thing, and the prime minister something else, and you are silent about this. Mr. Djukanovic is a prime minister who has resigned. He exists only until the election, he himself has announced that. We have heard his opinion of the federal state and of the federal government. It does not occur to Mr. Bulatovic, president of the Republic, to come here and say that. And where is the position of the DPS? Why is this being done to Prime Minister Djukanovic, to whom one of his ministers referred yesterday in a flight of exaltation as a national treasure of Montenegro? What are you doing with a national treasure who, in addition, is your vice president and the prime minister? You were allowing all kinds of things to be done to him even earlier. We remember the silence of the DPS deputy caucus when one deputy (Visnjic, SRS [Serbian Radical Party], author's note) called the prime minister all kinds of names in the crudest way."

Playing Down the Prime Minister's Visit to the United States

A reliable signal, however, that Prime Minister Djukanovic does not enjoy the support of that part of the top leadership of his party loyal to the Belgrade regime has always been the commitment of the most hated person in the government media, Emilo Labudovic, editor of Montenegrin TV. He has again become active in the old "wartime" manner as the long arm of the Bulatovic family clan, which holds Montenegrin television under its full control. In announcing the report about Milo Djukanovic's visit to the United States, Emilo said that Djukanovic had been talking there with the "world band [that is, gang]"!? Although he quickly corrected himself [presumably to World Bank], few people were inclined to believe that in the case of Labudovic this was a slip of the tongue. His uncultivated appearance and vocabulary overflowing with crude and indecent remarks and comments has been irritating the ears of the Montenegrin public too long for that.

Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic is visiting the United States for the second time in the last six months. The large-circulation Belgrade newspapers are not writing very much about his visit, which is taking place at a far higher level than the previous one, in the White House, the Congress, meetings with high-level representatives of the World Bank, the IMF, and the Ex-Im Bank. To pass over in silence and play down the visit of the prime minister of one of the members of the federal state to the United States, a key international partner on the one hand, and the uncritical opening up of the media to second-rate visits to countries of the Far East, provide a true picture of the balance of power at the moment in the FRY. Thus, the Montenegrin prime minister will get a taste of what it means to be completely ignored by the state media, to which the opposition leaders have long ago been inured.

Aside from the domestic silence about the visit to the United States, which obviously has been successful, the federal government has for its part tried to play down its importance wherever it could. Here is what Dr. Novak Kilibarda, president of the People's Party, said about this in the Montenegrin Assembly: "The Yugoslav Embassy, gentlemen, knows nothing about Milo Djukanovic's arrival in the United States. There has been no notification of this!?"

Commenting on the opposed views of the two governments concerning Governor Avramovic, Kilibarda added: "While the federal government is insisting on tales about the continuity of the FRY, Djukanovic is sending a message from Washington that he fully supports the governor concerning renewal of relations with the IMF, in words to the effect that all these long and sterile talks about succession and continuity must be superseded with the greatest urgency in order to bring about conditions for rapid settlement of our status in those financial institutions. At the same time, Mr. Bulatovic, the top party leader who heads this Montenegro, leaves the congress of the incumbent party of Serbia and says enthusiastically that the two incumbent parties are completely united in their ideology!"

The leader of the People's Party criticized the diametrically opposed commitments of the two republics in the way in which they conduct the country's foreign policy to deputies of the DPS as follows: "You cannot require citizens to understand what cannot be understood, that Serbia is showing its people in every way it can that their future lies in turning toward Korea and China. They have started with Moldavia, and then Mongolia, while the other part of that state is going to the United States. Mr. Bulatovic must go before the public and answer all these questions, not have the questions prepared for him by the editor in the television studio, former chief of staff of Sveta Marovic, under the bright sky of Herceg-Novi, but rather our legitimate head of state must face the journalists which we will send to him."

American-Montenegrin Chamber of Commerce

The arrow in flight from Belgrade has again upset to a fair degree the initial optimism of Prime Minister Djukanovic about getting American loans. During meetings with important representatives of the IMF in Washington, Djukanovic was confronted with the unpleasant

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situation that occurred when Avramovic was removed from the post of coordinator of Yugoslavia's negotiating team with the IMF and the still more unpleasant question of his hosts, who wanted to hear at first hand what is the real background and practical significance of the Avramovic-Zebic change. The answer of the Montenegrin prime minister "that in essence it is not important who heads the delegation of the FRY in future negotiations, but the essential thing is to accept the platform for renewal of relations presented by representatives of the IMF in Paris," was received with reserve.

But in spite of all the imputations and blockades accompanying this visit of the Montenegrins to America, events which are absolutely unknown to normal states in the world, some business was transacted. The Montenegrin delegation, which aside from Djukanovic also consisted of Finance Minister Predrag Goranovic and the prime minister's adviser Ratko Knezevic, was seeking financial aid above all to purchase airplanes for the national airline Montenegro Airlines, whose establishment is frequently being placed in the context of talk about Montenegro's future independence. The promising initial suggestion that the aid would, in fact, be offered came to the delegation from the U.S. Treasury. Numerous promises were made during negotiations with powerful American multinational corporations concerning possible investment in Montenegro, above all in development and manifold enrichment of Montenegro's tourist offering. In this connection, the Montenegrin prime minister signed a contract to form the joint American-Montenegrin Chamber of Commerce, with headquarters in New York, through which American capital will be invested in Montenegro.

FRY: Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict Said To Be Increasing

96BA0278B Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 96 pp 10-11

[Article by Milan Bozic: "Slovene Syndrome in Montenegro"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "old wolves" in the corridors of the Assembly, people who have spent their entire working life in offices and corridors of the Federal Assembly and who remember even the imperial times in which the Marshal (former machinist) strolled through the building in a uniform inescapably similar to what today is worn in concerts only by Michael Jackson and Lepa Brena, but who also remember times of the endless tug-of-war among the republics in conflict in various bodies for "self-management reconciliation of views" which indicated the breakup of the Yugoslav empire, are very worried.

Their "nose" tells them, and experience merely confirms it, that the atmosphere at the level of the federal state is very much like that at the end of the eighties. Except that the role of the Slovenes has been taken by the Montenegrins.

And truly, it is as though the "natural" conflict between the two federal units, more precisely between their leaderships, has intensified to a degree which exceeds the bounds of what is "natural."

Let us see whether, as the Marxists would say, that degree of naturalness which has been exceeded has passed over to a new "quality," that is, whether the conflict between the Serbian and Montenegrin leaderships has become final and irrevocable.

The moment at which we are writing this is very unfavorable for such assessments, but precisely for that reason it is important to evaluate the state of the "Montenegrin syndrome" and the extent to which it will influence political processes in Yugoslavia and, of course, in Serbia.

Mutualities among federal states in any country are a "natural thing." Everything, first and above all, revolves around one word: "money." It is self-evident that each federal unit tries to grab as much money as it can—I intentionally use the word "grab" because in a country like ours, one can hardly speak about normal earning, because most business borders on crime—to keep it to itself, and to turn over as little as possible to the paws of the federal state or, God forbid!, to a competitive federal unit. Aside from that motivation, in Yugoslavia, unfortunately, there is also another one lacking in normal, well-ordered, and democratic states. That is the question of freedom. After all, the current Serbian postcommunist regime, aside from restricting business freedoms, is also restricting political freedoms, so that the conflict between the two republics also arises on that political plane.

The conflict between Serbia and Montenegro up to now has mainly been on the first plane, the plane of financial interests. Finally, on the eve of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro were set at odds by two postcommunist parties which, according to the tried-and-true formula widespread in East Europe, replaced the adjective "communist" with the adjective "socialist" and continued to rule even after disintegration of the state, to which they themselves undoubtedly made an enormous contribution. The "sister" parties were also additionally linked by "kinship" strengthened by the circumstance that the smaller and younger came into being after the Yellow Barrier, when aid was offered from Serbia to the "antiseparatist" part of the Montenegrin, then communist, party. More accurately

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and truthfully, on the principle of *simili simili gaudet*, the more powerful Serbian sister maintained at that time the Stalinist and more hard-line current in the Montenegrin leadership. For domestic consumption in Serbia, on the other hand, it was said that the "pro-Serb" supposedly "white" faction had been supported, and, again supposedly, guaranteed us strong ties of alliance on the eve of the upcoming war, which no one mentioned, but of which everyone had a presentiment.

Momo and Milo, young and smiling, inseparable in the pictures, were represented as virtually the highest-quality product of the Belgrade personnel kitchen. Malicious tongues in the Belgrade opposition rumor mill even referred to Momir Bulatovic as "Sloba's kinder jaje," and his political behavior in the first years after he came to power, to tell the truth, did not provide any grounds whatsoever for changing that nickname.

Soon the war broke out, and everyone here forgot about Montenegro.

Only fragmentary news arrived from there. I personally remember the most the failed march on Dubrovnik, whose result was that the duty-free shops were relieved of fair amounts of whiskey and VCR's.

When the international referee whistled the end of the first, Croatian, halftime in the war for the Yugoslav legacy, and when it became clear that only two republics were left in Yugoslavia, a new Yugoslavia had to be patched together in haste in expectation of the second, Bosnian, halftime.

Failed Patchwork

Here "Sloba's kinder jaje" proved to be a quite serious player, not at all like his spiteful nickname. Not only he, but the entire Montenegrin leadership became conscious that the price had risen sharply, because naive hopes that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia could be held in Yugoslavia had definitively failed. Because Yugoslavia would have disappeared even down to the letter "Y" unless they at least joined up, they demanded a reasonable price for the service. And they received it in the form of the Zabljak constitution, which gave them an entirely equal political role with that of Serbia in the future state. I am not aware, and I am almost convinced that there does not exist, of any halfway normal state in the world in which there are only two federal units, one of which has one-seventeenth!! the population of the other and only one-thirtieth of the gross national income, yet they have equal rights under all legislation. That is, the Chamber of Republics in which Serbia and Montenegro have an equal number of deputies (20 apiece) must adopt all the laws just like the Citizens Chamber. In practical terms, Montenegro has the right to veto any law which it does not like, even if it has to do with the individual rights of citizens or statutes which do not affect the rights of the republics.

On the heights of Durmitor, the Montenegrin leadership, more precisely the top leaders of the incumbent DPS [Democratic Party of Socialist], has made very skillful use of this fantastic gift, obtained or snatched it does not matter now.

As the war progressed, the Montenegrin leadership has become more and more independent, carefully noting that the federal state is being marginalized more and more, carefully to draw as little attention as possible to itself, and thanks to the completely irregular conditions the country faced during the blockade, carefully taking advantage of the circumstance that all trade transactions with the world had passed from the sphere of trade to the sphere of smuggling.

It cannot be said that Milosevic was unaware of the growing independence of its own Yellow Barrier progeny. Finally, Bulatovic showed a predisposition toward independent permissiveness toward the international factor back during the Hague negotiations in 1991, when he signed an agreement which Milosevic rejected. The Zabljak constitution, that is, the firm position of the Montenegrins when it was patched together, has only intensified Milosevic's anxieties. That is why, for instance, in the Montenegrin election for president official Belgrade, through its media, and it is said through other adherents down below, aided Bulatovic's opponent, the notorious Branko Kostic, who won fame by assuming the obligation that the Army would protect the Serbs in Croatia a few days before it withdrew and who gained national glory by promising that we will "eat roots," but we will not give in to the pressure of world imperialism.

Shots in the Middle of Washington

Meanwhile, it turned out that Marko arrived late at Kosovo once again and the Bulatovic-Djukanovic tandem became so much stronger in Montenegro that the still more hard-line "veteran of the Yellow Barrier" could not rival them.

After that, the social and political processes in Montenegro took a "natural" course. The quotation marks are inserted here because of the war which surrounded them and gave them direction, because of the tribal, fraternal, patriarchal, communist, and all kinds of other overlays which have coated Montenegrin society, but also because of the influence and pressures of the elder "sister."

The outcome has been unexpectedly favorable.

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It has turned out, that is, that Montenegro has leapt higher, faster, and better "into Europe," if Mima Karadzic will forgive me this paraphrase. Whether because it has turned toward the sea and smuggling, whether because Montenegrin society is essentially smaller than that of Serbia, whether because of the youth of its two main protagonists of the "Montenegrin spring," it is no matter now, it has turned out that Montenegro has leapt ahead of Serbia in all respects. Privatization—whether honest or not changes nothing—has already been accomplished there, pensions are being paid regularly, contracts are being concluded with the West and performed without ideological constraints. In the meantime, the Montenegrin prime minister has leapt ahead of the president, so that this youngish Djukanovic has sped off to the United States, increasing the pressure on Milosevic and causing panic in the Foreign Ministry, which immediately came under investigation to establish whether it knew and whether it had aided the "illegal effort" of the Montenegrin prime minister.

When the Stalinist structure here opened fire on Grandpa Avram, Djukanovic did not hesitate to offer the governor support from Washington.

The Montenegrin leadership even found the true measure for "usury," fully "taking the measure" of Slobodan Perovic, whose Liberal Party has been behaving like nothing more than a caricature and who obviously has been thrown entirely from his saddle by the skillful maneuver toward Montenegrin independence, which is on the delicate razor's edge between separatism and a loosely conceived federalism.

Kertes' competence ceases at the Montenegrin border, and no JUL [United Yugoslav Left] or any retrograde processes are visible in Montenegro.

The postcommunist leadership of Montenegro has obviously traveled a longer and more serious road than the leadership of Montenegro [(?) Serbia]. It is no longer dreaming about Zyuganov's victory in the Russian election, but about investments from Europe and the world.

Official and Unofficial Belgrade

We should not, of course, tell lies to ourselves and deceive ourselves. The Montenegrin leadership will independently assess its prospects and interests in the conflict into which it has entered with the Serbian leadership because of the "easily gained advancement." At the same time, it is exceedingly ready to protect its interests from its own opposition. We should not forget the campaign against Kilibarda, which was unpleasantly similar to the campaign of TV Bastille against Vuk.

But no matter. Until a few months ago, it seemed that any conflict of interest between the two leaderships could be resolved with 100 or so million and a few ambassadorships. Now, however, hope is awakened that Montenegro has crossed the Rubicon. It does not want to go back to the retrograde processes offered by Belgrade. At the same time, the resistance of political forces in Montenegro itself against a leadership which is behaving too "anticommunist" and "anti-Belgrade" could be a point of support for some new Yellow Barrier. Nor is it clear how cohesive the Montenegrin leadership is internally and whether some new Branko Kostic might be found among them. In addition, Belgrade's police power and economic power is not to be underestimated. Which is not to mention the influence of the "Belgrade Montenegrins."

So, we have before us a number of unknowns. The outcome or the direction the thing will take will depend mostly on the internal mind-set of the Montenegrin leadership concerning the extent to which its interests and aspirations to civilization suit the postcommunist model offered by official Belgrade.

But aside from official Belgrade, there is also the "unofficial" oppositional Belgrade and Serbia. That is why in the coming federal election the position of the Montenegrin leadership may be critically important to the country's liberation from the civilizational evil. That position is undefined at the moment.

The real sign of maturity and of finally crossing to the other side of the river will be the readiness to cooperate with democratic opposition parties in Serbia. On the other hand, even they must show maturity and seriousness, must leave behind ideological bias, and present themselves as a serious partner.

The door is open.

A sign is needed. We are waiting for it.

FRY: Former Senior Policeman Shot Dead in Belgrade

LD2105210696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1454 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 May (Tanjug)—Miroslav Bizic, aged 45, of Ulica Lipa 12 [Belgrade], was killed on the steps of the Jugocentar shopping mall in Novi Beograd [district of Belgrade] at about 0915 [0715 GMT] today. The Secretariat for Internal Affairs [SUP] is working to shed light on this murder, the police statement adds.

According to eyewitnesses, Bizic was on the steps of the former Merkator building, on virtually the same spot

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where Zorz Stankovic [well-known Belgrade criminal] was murdered [a few years ago]. A man of medium height, dressed in a blue boiler suit, came up to Bizic, grabbed him by the shoulder and fired several shots at him. Witnesses say that no shot rang out, so it is assumed the weapon had a silencer.

Bizic was once a member of the Belgrade SUP, and since 1990 he has been the owner of Biza, an agency which traces mainly stolen vehicles. The agency's offices are on one of the floors of the building in front of which he was murdered.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic, U.S. Official Discuss Dayton Implementation

LD2205163996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 22 May (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, today received John Kornblum, assistant U.S. secretary of state, who arrived in Belgrade heading a U.S. delegation in charge of the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

The meeting focused on the efforts that the FRY and the international community are investing in the successful implementation of the peace plan in Bosnia.

The two sides said that the activities undertaken so far have ensured successful preparations for the forthcoming elections, which would provide a basis for the establishment of democratic institutions. They drew attention to the steps made in ensuring freedom of movement for citizens. As part of the necessary preparations for the elections, Milosevic and Kornblum expressed their expectations that the procedure for the appointment of electoral commissions in all municipalities would be finalized, and that the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission would be officially briefed on this as soon as possible—on the basis of a report which has just been submitted by top officials of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic. It is necessary to accelerate the process of economic reconstruction in areas affected by the civil war and the two entities should be entitled to equal treatment.

Regular political dialogue between the FRY and the United States undoubtedly contributes toward promoting bilateral relations between the two countries, paving the way to full normalization, in the interest of the consolidation of peace and stability in the region and equality in international relations.

Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Lawrence Butler, U.S. charge d'affaires in Belgrade, took part in the talks.

Serbia: Kornblum Briefs Media on Talks With Milosevic

AU2205192396 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference for domestic and foreign journalists, John Kornblum, head of the U.S. negotiating team for the previous Yugoslavia, described the talks with President Slobodan Milosevic as a complete exchange of views on all essential issues concerning the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

Kornblum said that the agreement is being successfully implemented on the whole, but since this document provides deadlines for all stages in its implementation, such as elections, it is necessary to do everything to meet these deadlines.

Kornblum repeated the U.S. position that those The Hague Tribunal has filed indictments against cannot hold any political post in the Serb Republic. John Kornblum said that all the signatories of the Dayton agreement should fully implement everything that has been agreed, from which the Serb Republic can also benefit.

The United States is also actively working on this, John Kornblum, head of the U.S. negotiating team for the previous Yugoslavia, stressed after his talks with President Milosevic.

Serbia: Kosovo Serbs Accuse Milosevic of Breaking Promises

AU2305132896 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "We Want the Truth About Kosovo!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija have sent a letter to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in which they demand that he presents his policy on the settlement of the situation in the southern Serbian province, because there have been increasing rumors that "the issue was already resolved in Dayton."

In the letter composed last Saturday [18 May] at a minicongress, which was attended by several thousand people, it is also said that, according to the rumors, "through some secret talks" the Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins have been "set back to the position of

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the 1974 Constitution," which is why they began their protests precisely 10 years ago.

"Mr. President, having listened to your promises and message at the rally on 24-25 April 1987 on Kosovo Polje plain, which read: 'You ought to stay here, for the sake of your ancestors and your descendants. Otherwise, you would bring shame upon your ancestors and disappoint your descendants,' the Serb people have endured a difficult time.

"Unfortunately, time has passed, the words have remained a dead letter, and the promises have not been fulfilled," it is pointed out in the letter.

The letter points to increasingly frequent cases of organized terrorism by ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija, uncertainty, concern, and the feeling of insecurity for the survival of the ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins on their centuries-old land, who, it is claimed, are in much greater danger today than they were in 1987, which has caused a new wave of migration to start.

The signatories of the letter demand that the Serbian president comes to Pristina on 22 June and presents his policy on the settlement of the Kosovo-Metohija issue to the representatives of the ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and Metohija.

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